Introduction
Latin America is often over looked for SOE – E/ UP operations but also was under the Continental Action as a whole (Ciechanowski, 2005). There were many Polish diasporas in Latin America with Polish legations in many countries to help look after the Polish community that had been operating during the interwar period (Skóra, 2019). Their integration in some countries was limited because they had set up their own schools, welfare systems and cultural centres. Most nations remained neutral with the exceptions of Brazil and Mexico. Brazil sent 25,000 troops to Italy to support the Italian campaign and Mexico deployed their 201 Squadron (Aztec Eagles) to support the Pacific Campaign in the liberation of the Philippines.
The Allies had access to additional facilities in the Latin American countries with strategic bases in Cuba, Panama and Caribbean Islands forming a chain across the region in the hunt for U-boats that were attacking convoys of raw materials. Mexico and Uruguay experienced economic booms during this period. Argentina and Uruguay exported agricultural products while Chile’s copper, Colombia’s platinum, Peru’s cotton and petroleum products from Mexico and Venezuela were exported to the USA and distorted their economies. After the attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese on 7th December 1941, many Latin American countries cut their ties with the Axis powers. It is estimated the Lend-Lease programme to support bases in the region saw $400 million in exchange for raw materials.
Against this back-drop, Allied intelligence services were concerned about political shifts towards neo-Nazi regimes that could destabilise the resourcing of essential materials. Hemingway’s novel, Islands in the Stream published posthumously captures the spirit of an adventurer and U-boat hunter.
Hitler was not particularly interested in Latin America but acknowledge that its neutrality and need to supply raw materials were important. The Foreign Security Service (Ausland-SD) Section D-4 operated Operation BOLÍVAR was an intelligence and communications operation based in Argentina with most of its agents arrested by mid-1944. Most countries kept a close watch on the German communities and some deported Germans during the war.
E/ UP Operations:
Logistically and diplomatically, supplying the legations in Latin America needed the British Foreign Office (FO) approval (TNA/ HS4-232). Transport was to be by the MS. Rozewie, a 766-ton Polish cargo ship built in Finland in 1938 and had managed to escape the Baltic blockade when trapped in Sweden.
Source: Narodowe Muzeum Morskie w Gdańsku.
After escaping to Britain in November 1939, it was allocated carrying cargo from Latin America to New York. It was planned the ship under the command of Capt. Jerzy Lewandowski would agree to transporting sabotage equipment and W/T sets and agent GOMEZ/ ROCA (Edward Paciorkowski) would be able to agree to the mission. However, Lewandowski and the ships owners alongside the Polish Foreign Ministry objected to diplomatic bags. Lewandowski and GOMEZ decided to use members of the Saintly-Soledad organisation to use coastal traffic to smuggle these items to the various legations (TNA/ HS4-232). On 6th August 1942, she was sunk by U-boat 66 off Trinidad with three casualties. The remaining crew and Capt. Lewandowski were taken to Germany as POWs.
In Salvador, civilians were employed and consisted of Józef Soboliński and Jermi Stempowski (Ciechanowski, 2005). Mr M. Kaczmarek joined later, to assist Paciorkowski whose contacts included Lati-Condor Air Service. Paciorkowski would ‘flaunt’ his contacts with US intelligence and came under scrutiny by German counterintelligence (Ciechanowski, 2005).
The operation was under the control of the Estezet Station in New York run by Sylwin Strakacz and Lt. Col. Ludwig Lucjan Sadowski (Sadwig) under the guise of the Polish Consulate General (Ciechanowski, 2013). Their main activities were to cover USA, Canada, Brazil (Inca), Argentina (Perełka) whose Station was called Sabanilla in Rio de Janeiro (Buenos Aires was called Salvador) and indirectly Chile (Almagro), Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru and Bolivia. They were to monitor the Polish diaspora for infiltration of communists and any activity that would damage the US, Canada and Polish affairs. In effect it was a counterintelligence operation headed by Capt. Henryk Żychoń Schmidt. Michał Glazer (Czarny) a specialist in Jewish affairs, Józef Śliwowski (Mazur) who had operated in Portugal (Station P) and Helena Sworakowska (Helena Monwid), a translator made up the core of the New York Station (Ciechanowski, 2013). The Station was not known to the Polish II Bureau. The Station in Buenos Aires was the hub of the intelligence operation as part of the Ministry of Interiors ANGELICA operation (TNA/ HS4-232).
The Station started cooperation with the US during the summer of 1941. The operation was sanctioned by President Roosevelt through William J Donovan acting as a mediator and retired Polish Col. Jan Henryk Żychoń. Żychoń prepared the planning of the operation for the US intelligence with a high degree of secrecy where there was no direct contact with the station in New York or the Legations in Latin America. The intelligence reports covered Axis morale as well as material losses and German activities in the region (Ciechanowski, 2013). The New York station also covered collection of information on Ukrainian emigres on behalf of the US and after 13th June 1942 was handled by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and later the US Military Intelligence Division (G-2) which was a clandestine contact (Ciechanowski, 2013). Counterintelligence on German minorities, Ukrainian and pro-Nazi White Russians was passed over to the authorities and the FBI. Intelligence on Germans in Argentina was collated by Maj. Marian Chodacki (Maracz) from 1943.
From July to December 1943 over 9,000 reports were passed to the US authorities and then this slightly decreased over 1944 to an average of 6,000 and in early 1945 this had dropped to 869 (Ciechanowski, 2013). The quality of the intelligence reports compiled by the Poles was recognised by Gen. Hayes A. Kroner ‘as the best in the World for little in return’ (Chodakiewicz, 2007) since the reports spanned a wide range of issues they covered. Estezet Station was closed in September 1943, but intelligence from Latin America continued to be collected by the SNW department run by Col. Mitkiewicz- Żółtek of II Bureau through the Polish Consulate. In America the Poles had stations in almost all major cities such as Buffalo, Chicago and Washington and Ottawa in Canada.
Abwehr agents were planning coups in Brazil, Argentina and Chile where pro-Nazi sympathisers were taking advantage of increasingly popular fascist movements. In December 1942 the Brazilian censors stopped the newspaper Corrio Do Parana blocked a report into Japanese 5th columnists who had been operating in a military zone (TNA/ HS4-232) with a copy of the report in Polish being sent to Estezet Station in New York. On 27th February 1942, the political activities of Dionisio Foianini Banzer, came to the attention of the Poles. He was Minister for Munitions and a Nazi sympathiser was planning a coup and sabotage tin supplies to the Allies (TNA/ HS4-232) and had a secret meeting in Argentina with acting President Castillo whose dislike of US sanctions hardened when he learned a radical group led by Deputy Raúl Damonte Taborda were seeking arms from the US to put a stop to the Nazi activities being run through the German embassy (Anon, 1941; Banta Murkland, 1941). In an additional report dated 7th August 1942, there was evidence of an Argentinian cabinet shuffle which would preclude an army coup that was pro-Axis and antisemitic (TNA/ HS4-232). The report indicated that Uruguay might join a pro- German bloc. President Castillo’s illness indicated he would resign in favour of Senator Patroncosta which was opposed by the military. On 20th August, the President announced his resignation and replacement by a military Junta with Dr. Fresco, a prominent totalitarian leader taking over internal affairs. In mid-June 1942 Germany had agreed in principle to protect Argentinian shipping. The Allies had misunderstood the situation and Argentina expressed it was ‘sympathetically neutral’ to the Axis countries (TNA/ HS4-232). In response, the Allies sought to strengthen its ties and support for Brazil despite the desire to become less dependent on the US. The Germans had been infiltrating agents into Brazil via Uruguay and Paraguay.
Paciorkowski reported his concerns over a lack of US intervention in the potential Bolivian coup and stressed he had limited resources in Bolivia to do any covert operations (TNA/ HS4-232) since tine was exported through the ports of Arica and Antofagasta. These views were reflected by Jan Librach who had concerns SOE were using their agents in Latin America where the lack of resources could not stretch to blocking any coups or be involved in any sabotage operations. Foianini Banzer was forced to delay the coup in June 1942.
In Uruguay, President Alfredo Baldomir had seized power in a military backed coup (Golpe de Boldomir) in 1942 to purge the government of the pro-Axis National Party (Blanco) who blocked relationships with the Allies. The regime cracked down on political activities of Nazi sympathisers and severed diplomatic ties with the Axis powers. It was not until 1943 when a new democratic constitution enabled civilian rule to be restored.
Paraguay’s wartime experience was one of instability with multiple attempts for a coup. President Morinigo’s government eventually declared war on the Axis powers in February 1945 under pressure from the Allies who used the Lend-Lease Agreements as leverage.. Demands for a democracy sparked a failed coup in December 1946 which triggered the devasting Paraguayan Civil War in 1947.
In Brazil, the October 1945 coup d’etat ended the authoritarian dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas who had paradoxically supported the Allies. The military Junta led by Eurico Gaspar Dutra and Góis Monteiro enabled the head of the Supreme Court, José Linhares to be interim president. Free general elections took place on 2nd December 1945.
In Chile, a failed coup in 1938 enabled the regime to support the Axis until 1943 when the Allies again used the Lend-Lease Agreements to pressurise the regime into switching sides and formally declared war on Japan in February 1945.
Bolivia’s President Peñaranda had aligned Bolivia to the Allies, however economic hardships led to a tin miners strike. The Catavi Massacre in December 1942 and the brutal military suppression of the tin miners prompted Maj. Gualberto Villarroel and the nationalist party (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) to stage a coup. It was not until June 1944 when diplomatic relations with the Allies were restored and mineral shipments assured, did the Allies suspicions diminish.
The operations in Latin America started to be wound down with the station in Buenos Airies liquidated in October 1944. Requests for visas for the former agents were made. Zbigniew Goledzinowski (Santiago), Eugeniusz Gruda (from Rio de Janeiro but operated in Brazil) were a few named in the file. The report on E/ UP activities in Latin America is scant, and the real story remains largely untold. The intelligence reports were highly regarded by both Britain and the USA. However, the political fallout continued for many decades later.
Selected References:
Anon (1941) “Argentina: Hunting a Nazi”, Time 8th September 1941
https://time.com/archive/6786962/argentina-hunting-a-nazi/
Banta Murkland, H. (1941) “The Hispanic American Record”, The Historic American Record, Vol. 1, No.2, pp.169-176.
Chodakiewiicz, M.J. (2007) “England’s Poles in the Game: WWII Intelligence Cooperation”, Journal of U.S Intelligence Studies, Vol.15, No.2, pp.98-100.
Ciechanowski, J.S (2005) “North and South America”, in Sterling, T; Nałecz, D and Dubicki, T (Eds) “The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee Vol.1”, Valentine Mitchel, UK, Ch 38, pp. 350-369.
Ciechanowski, J. S (2013) “Wywiad polski w Ameryce Północnej i Południowej
w czasie II wojny światowej”, Wydawnictwo Akademii im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie; Wydawnictwo Państwowej Wyższej Szkoły Zawodowej we Włocławku, pp.99-126.
Dimitrakis, P. (2020) “The Hidden War in Argentina: British and American Espionage in World War II”, Bloomsbury Academic, UK.
Leonard, T.M. and Bratzel, J.F. (2006) “Latin America During World War II”, Jaguar Books, USA.
Skóra, W. (2019) “Polish Diaspora and Military Intelligence of the Second Republic, 1918-1939: An Outline of the Problem”, Studia Polonijne, pp.209-221. dx.doi.org/10.18290/sp.2019.11
Selected Web Sites:
