Background:
A British military mission was sent to Poland in December 1944 to ascertain the conditions in the country post Warsaw Rising and attempt to liaise between the AK and the Soviets as relations had broken down. The mission was requested by Prime Minister Mikołajczyk who wanted observers sent into Poland to monitor reports of Soviet’s behaviour towards the AK and assist in coordinating military action (Durka, 2007). The request by Poland to send the mission was not without controversy since Britain’s Foreign Office was increasingly becoming anti-Polish as the war was showing signs of ending (TNA/HS4-145; Kochanski,2012). Anthony Eden, Foreign Office Secretary demonstrated the need for decisions that supported the Yalta Agreement to be imposed upon central and eastern Europe to settle the war’s outcomes. The Foreign Office (FO) supported the view that the Soviet’s would view the mission as hostile since the mission would be in territory already claimed by the Soviets east of the Curzon Line. By July 1944, the FO’s stance no longer ‘held water due to the rapid Soviet advances westward and showed no signs of altering their attitude (Kochanski, 2012). The halting of their advance westwards at Warsaw in August 1944 during the Uprising demonstrated a degree of callousness, betrayal and subverting their claim to the liberators of Poland rather than the liquidation of the AK by the Soviets (Durka, 2005). The specific orders to the commanders of the 1st People’s Army led by Col. Berling not to intervene, confirmed the Soviets attitude towards the AK. Repeated calls for a mission to Poland gained greater traction by October 1944 since the reports from Poland indicated the hostility towards the AK and numerous incidents of execution, imprisonment or forced conscription could no longer be ignored (Durka, 2005). Col. Michał Protasewicz (head of Polish Section SOE) petitioned Col. Perkins to assembly an inter-allied mission (ibid). A team was assembled and sent to Brindisi in Italy.
Molotov was informed that liaison officers were being sent to obtain direct trustworthy information (Kochanski, 2012) rather than rely on Soviet reports that contradicted the AK. It also appeared that since the Soviet entry into Poland, AK commanders felt there was a lack of direction from Gen. Sosnkowski as G.O.C (TNA/ HS4-249) adding to an already complex situation both politically and militarily on the eve of Operation TEMPEST. Sosnowski had been dismissed late September 1944 clearing the way for a more proactive policy towards the Soviets.
The Mission:
The team was parachuted into Poland on the 26th-27th December 1944 near Żarki, 30km south-east of Częstochowa, the AK home command H.Q. after the failure of the Warsaw Rising after several attempts were postponed by poor weather (Bystrzanowice village, approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Częstochowa and aligned with the coordinates N50°41’00” E19°31’40” – Durka, 2005).
The original team consisted of Col. W. (Bill) Hudson (GIN) as commander, Maj. P.R.C. Solly-Flood (MUR), Maj. Alun Morgan of M.I.6 (NAG), Maj. P. Kemp (RUM), Capt. Anthony Currie (Antoni Pospieszalski–Cichociemni) aka Łuk, Professor, Trepka and Rosomak (CUR) and Sgt. Maj. D. Galbraith (DON).
Bill Hudson (Marko) had been asigned to the BULLSEYE operation in Yugoslavia (Montenegro) and was an experienced SOE operative behind enemy lines (https://polandinexile.com/article/soe-poles-and-the-balkan-connection/). Maj. Solly-Flood was a career officer and had completed his mission to Yugoslavia (Operation DIPPER). Antoni Pospieszalski acted as an interpreter and communications specialist (former instructor at Audley End, STS 43) to support Galbraith a W/T operator from the Signals Corps. Capt. Morgan had been in charge of Operation TORMENT, based in Brindisi withdrew from the operation due to ill health (Davies, 2003; Durka, 2005). (See also https://polandinexile.com/article/training-bases-for-the-polish-section-s-o-e-cichociemni/).
They took off from Hurn airport, near Bournemouth on 13th October 1944 for Brindisi, the same day the Polish Prime Minister Mikołajczyk was ‘diplomatically mugged in Moscow (Davies, 2003 p.448). On arrival in Brindisi, no one was expecting them. They were temporally housed in a remote villa La Silva, near Fasano, south of Monopoli (Durka, 2005) to maintain secrecy. The chosen drop zone was close to the AK’s radio station Ogrek-303 in the Janó-Żarki area (Durka, 2005). Prior to their despatch to Poland, Col. Roman Rudkowski (Rudy) was dropped into Poland on 16-17th October 1944 (Operation POLDEK 1) to prepare for the mission (Durka, 2005) and was a veteran of Operation MOSTY II which took place on 29 – 30th May 1944. Gen. Tatar had originally envisaged three missions to cover Kraków, Radom and Łódź (Durka, 2005) where the AK were operational, however at this stage of the war and with Soviet advances, this was now impossible.
The drop zone had been manned by a reception committee led by Lt. Stanisław Wencel (Twardy) who had secured the site. The team were flown to Poland onboard a converted Libertor VI heavy bomber, KG-994 “R” of the 301st Squadron, PAF (TNA/ HS4-249) attached to the 1586 Special Duties Squadron which was later renumbered FS-R.
The local AK operated several drop sites in the area: Trawa and Oleander and were experienced ground crew. Additional cannisters and ‘baskets’ contained W/T equipment and ciphers to support the team’s role. Visibilty had been poor and the frozen ground caused minor injuries to Hudson. Pospieszalski was dropped short and it took time to trace his whereabouts. Once the identies of the team had been verified, they moved off to the village of Włynice to the N:E of Częstochowa. Here the team with the support of the local AK assessed the mission and contacted Lt. Józef Kotecki (Warta), commander of the 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion, 27th Home Army Infantry Regiment. They were joined by 2nd Lt. Szymon Zaremba (Jerzy) the operations chief for the Home Army’s Radom District, whereupon they were moved to Bystrzanowice, an estate owned by his sister Zofia. As the front stabilised, there were a number of partisan and AK units concealed in the forests suffering from lack of food, medicine and ammunition. The Soviets held the front which gave the Wehrmacht time to clear the rear of ‘bandits’ which forced the AK to reduce its numbers by releasing the injured, sick and poorly armed from duty representing approximately 20% of the force (Durker, 2005).
Source: N/K
The Mission started to document the Wehrmacht’s impact on the post Warsaw Rising on the local population and the AK’s ability to maintain sabotage operations (Durker, 2005) and carry out assassinations of the Gestapo. However, Gen. Okulicki’s opinion considered the inter-allied mission may do more harm than good since the AK were exhausted and short in supplies with the Wehrmacht raiding houses in Częstochowa seeking out senior officers. The team also ‘sounded out’ the troops and the local population attitude towards the Soviets and the 1st Polish People’s Army. They were also interested in contacting the Holy Cross Brigade which was operating south of Radom in the forests between Kielce and Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski or the Świętokrzyskie Mountains (Durker, 2005). They also had the opportunity to interview Soviet paratroopers and POWs.
On 30th December 1944 the team received new orders to move to Rędziński Forest, leaving the heavier W/T transmitters hidden in the Złoto Potoku Forest and taking two lighter W/T sets to stay in contact with Britain. Lt. Stanisław Wencel (Twardy) accompanied them on an overnight march, and the route took them close to the towns of Przyrów, Dąbrowa Zielona, Cieletniki, Sekursko, Żytno to Włynice (Bines, 1999; Durker, 2005). They were protected by a 25 memebers of a combat unit led by 2nd Lt. Józef Kotecki (Warta). They were then joined by Maj. Franciszek Polkowski (Stefan), commander of the 27th Infantry Regiment. From here, they left for the village of Katarzynów to the Dembowski’s manor house Durker, 2005). Over the New Year, they were joined by Capt. Florian Budniak (Andrzej), commander of the 74th Infantry Regiment and Lt. Mieczysław Tarchalski (Marcin) welcomed the New Year. Reconnaissance missions indicated there were 50 Wehrmacht filed gendarmes in Złoty Potok and 80 SS troops in Żarki. On 1st January 1945, the Germans launched a surprise attack on the Dembowski’s manor house (TNA/ HS4-249). The column consisted of 3-5 tanks, armoured personnel carriers and motorbikes. 2nd Lt. Kotecki assisted in evading encirclement with one wounded and the loss of one W/T set when they escaped into the forest. Here another AK unit led by Lt. Karol Kutnicki (Kruk) to reinforce them.
Freston Itinerary – Source TNA/ HS4-249.
On 3rd January 1945, the team moved to a foresters lodge at Zacisze by horse-drawn sleigh (Davies, 2003), near Mały and was met by Col. Roman Rudkowski (Rudy) who had made the preparations for the mission (TNA/ HS4-249). The meeting was also attended by Jan Zientarski, commander of the Jodła District and Col. Janusz Bokszczanin, Chief of Staff to the AK (Durka, 2005). They were also joined by Gen. Leopold Okulicki (Niedźwiadek). The meeting covered the current relations with the Soviets and the Polish People’s Army. During the meeting, Okulicki believed once the Germans were defeated and the Nazis capitulated, the Allies would turn their forces against the Soviets (TNA/HS4-249; Davies, 2003). Okulicki was cautious in his understanding and relations with the Soviets since there had been numerous incidents where cooperation ended in tragedy for the AK which would be disbanded on the Soviets taking control of local areas. The British mission now understood the degree of severity the Poles were now facing (TNA/HS4-249). It was agreed Lt. Szymon Zaremba (Jerzy) would take the place of Alun Morgan. Zaremba was already under a death sentence by the Polish People’s Army (A.L) and had survived interrogation by the Gestapo who sought a ransome for his release (Walker, 2008).
The FRESTON mission set off for further meetings with other military groups such as the N.S.Z and A.L in a variety of locations where the opinion of the refugees from the Warsaw Rising were included for their final report (TNA/ HS4-249). Lt. Józef Kowalski (Alm) acted as a liaison officer between the mission and AK H.Q. (Durka, 2005). By 5th January 1945, the presence of the British mission was increasingly perilous and Col. Hudson requested Major Andrezej Kennedy (Roman Kowerski) and Christine Granville (Krystyna Skarbek) who operated under the alias of Folkestone should be sent to Poland and join the FRESTON team. Both Kennedy and Granville were outstanding SOE operatives in clandestine operations and Polish. Kennedy was assigned to Operation FLAMSTEAD (Capt. Marchant) and would include Operation FERNHAM (Maj. Paul Harker) was due to be sent to Kraków (see https://polandinexile.com/article/operation-flamstead-and-fernham/) was cancelled in late January 1945.
The FRESTON team were now behind the Soviet front lines with the supporting AK units withdrawn on the orders of Okulicki (TNA/HS4-249). On 16th January 1945, the team split into two with Lt. Szymon Zaremba (Jerzy) dressed in British battle fatigues and took on the identity of Alun Morgan. The first group with Maj. Solly-Flood and Capt. Anthony Currie (Antoni Pospieszalski) headed to Radom to retreive the W/T set hidden there. The second team remained at Katarzynów near Łódź (TNA/ HS4-249).
Solly-Flood and Currie were picked up by a Soviet patrol (Mongolian troops belonging to a Tank Brigade) and taken to Żytno and interrogated (Davies, 2003). The next day they were taken back to Katarzynów. Hudson and the rest of the team, having encountered a Soviet patrol were now being held there under guard. After interrogation, their equipment which included W/T sets and arms were confiscated. On 26th January 1945 FRESTON were transported to Częstochowa (Bines, 1999; Davies, 2003; Durka, 2005), whereupon they wrote a letter of protest to Marshall Ivan Konev and the British Embassy in Moscow protested about the arrests. Molotov initially denied the Soviets were holding the team and eventually relented on 3rd May 1945 (Kochanski, 2012). They were then put under ‘house arrest’ and transported to Moscow. With them was an additional ‘AK officer,’ Manfred Zenker an Austrian deserter who was quickly exposed as an imposter (TNA/ HS4-249; Bines, 1999). On 11th February 1945, FRESTON was transported to Mielec, NNW of Rzeszów which uncannily coincided with the end of the Yalta Conference. On 13th February 1945, they were flown to Lwow and then by train to Moscow via Kiev. Finally, the NKVD decided they had no further use or need to detain them and were released except for Lt. Zaremba who the Soviets showed great interest in him. FRESTON were released on 16th March 1945, they were transported to Odessa, Baku, Tehran, Cairo and Gibraltar, arriving in Britain on 21st March 1945. Lt. Zaremba remained in the British Embassy and survived two assassination attempts by the NKVD. After 6 months, he was flown to London. The identity of Capt. Anthony Currie was never discovered by the NKVD.
Post Script:
The Poles were betrayed and let-down at Yalta by the Allies who were more interested in the up and coming elections in Britain and the USA. As Okulicki predicted and Mikołajczyk feared, mass arrests and imprisonment of former AK soldiers and civilians in former administrative posts helped the Lublin Committee to have a degree of control on the population that without the NKVD would have been a difficult task.
Hudson’s report is very detailed in the structure of the AK, its weapons and strengths. It also covers socio-economic conditions and details of the destruction of farming equipment and theft of livestock and grain for the coming Spring sowing. The A.L had imposed levies on landowners or face the farmsteads being plundered (TNA/ HS4-249), adding to the misery and likelihood of famine.
While in Moscow the FRESTON team were talked to by a ‘senior British Officer’ who instructed them to tell a cover story that the Red Army had freed them from a POW camp in eastern Germany (Davies, 2003 p.451) with the ‘truth’ revealed several years later.
Durka (2005) identified a post war mission by the Polish communist government, Monopol-V where the original landing and drop zones used by the AK were thought to being used to transport enemy agents and passengers into and out of Poland. The report also included details of the hostility between the A.L and the N.S.Z / Holy Cross Brigade (TNA/ HS4-249) which had 1,200 men and commanded by Lt. Col. Anthoni Szacki (Bohun-Dabrowski).
Selected References:
Bines, J. (1999) “Operation Freston: The British Military Mission to Poland , 1944”, self-published by Jeffrey Bines, UK.
Davies, N. (2003) “Rising ’44: The Battle for Warsaw”, Macmillan, UK.
Durka, J. (2005) “Freston- brytyjska misja wojskowa SOE w Polsce. Przygotowania – przebieg – fiasko”, Zeszyty Historyczne, Vol.2, No. 178, pp. 97-121.
Kochanski,H. (2012) “The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War”, Allen Lane, UK.
Walker, J. (2008) “Poland Alone: Britain, SOE and the Collapse of the Polish Resistance, 1944”, The History Press, UK.
Additional References:
Drodzy, T. (1992) “Źródła
OPERACJA SOE1 POD KRYPTONIMEM „FRESTON”
MISJA BRYTYJSKA W POLSCE – 1944/1945″, Przegląd Zachodni, Issue No. 2, pp.176-198
Durka, J. (2007) “Freston” – brytyjska misja wojskowa SOE w Polsce. Przygotowania – przebieg – fiasko”, Zeszyty Historyczne, No. 161, pp.97-121.
Zieliński, Z. (2007) “Brytyjska Misja Wojskowa SOE
FRESTON 1944″, Niepodległość i Pamięć, No.14/1, Vol. 25, pp. 157-166
Šuchová, X. (2011) “Idea československého štátu na Slovensku 1918–1939 (The Idea of the Czechoslovak State in Slovakia) I“, Historický ústav SAV vo Vydavateľstve Prodama, Slovakia. This is an excellent book covering the economic, political and societal conflicts of the newly emerged state of Czechoslovakia post Treaty of Versailles.
Selected Websites:
https://www.thetimes.com/travel/destinations/uk-travel/england/london-travel/szymon-zaremba-l99gml07hl6 – Zaremba’s obituary
Selected YouTube Videos:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kiU6FB9dggI – NSZ Holy Cross Mountains Brigade
