The Polish nation re-emerged in 1918 after 123 years of obscurity and subjugation by Germany, Russia, and the Austro – Hungarian Empire. While the Poles quickly implemented political and economic systems to attain ‘nationhood,” external forces were quick to seize on any opportunity to test Poland’s strength while there was a vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. Within three years of its re-emergence, Poland had fought forces from Germany, Lithuania, the Ukraine and Russia over sovereignty of land created through the Treaty of Versailles.
While Polish politicians like Dmowski wanted frontiers based upon ethnic boundaries which tallied with Lord Curzon’s proposals for Poland’s future boundaries (Rees, 2009), many Poles sought the former glory of the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth which had existed at the end of the eighteenth century. While Dmowski’s National Committee was officially recognised as representing Poland at the Paris conference (Paczkowski, 2003; Kochanski, 2012) Piłsudski had in 1918 declared an independent nation and sought to push boundaries further East reminiscent of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the antagonism of Russia (Paczkowski, 2003; Rees, 2009; Kochanski, 2012). The Soviets saw Poland as a barrier to the expansion of communism that resulted in a disastrous war in 1920 with Pitsudski’s genius military stroke almost annihilating the Soviets at the gates of Warsaw – The Miracle on the Vistula. The Soviet losses were substantial with almost 10,000 killed, 30,000 missing and 66,000 prisoners. The Soviet army that attacked Poland was led by Vladimir Lenin who suffered further defeats that resulted in peace treaties between the Poles, Soviets and the Ukrainians securing Poland’s eastern frontiers for the time being at the Treaty of Riga. The Soviets still ‘smarting’ from the defeat, started to undermine the Treaty of Riga by passing a resolution at the Cominton’s 5th Congress for East Galicia to be incorporated into the Soviet Union (Rogalski, 2017). The regional Commissar, Josef Stalin tried to cover his failings in the defeat through using Lord Curzon’s proposals as a cover for political manipulation within the region (Rees, 2009).
The ‘Polish Question’ had dogged politicians both during war and at the Treaty of Versailles (Kochanski, 2012) on the future shape of Poland’s borders, particularly with Germany. Several options faced the Entente where the focus on internationalising the Vistula to give Poland access to the sea at Danzig (Gdańsk) (Kochanski, 2012) resulted in the Polish Corridor as a compromise that would have far reaching consequences in the eyes of the newly elected Adolph Hitler (Moorhouse, 2019) despite the issue being settled in Article 104 of the Treaty of Versailles (Kochanski, 2012). While Britain had lobbied for the Curzon Line to be adopted to delineate the eastern border giving some recognition to of independence to Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian interests (the area known as Kresy) within the geographic region, Piłsudski’s land grab and Polonisation infuriated the local populous (Rogalski, 2017) with new landlords taking the more fertile land. These were initially ‘gifted’ to ex-military who had fought in the Russo-Polish war and later entrepreneurs taking up attractive loans to develop the agrarian economy (Rogalski, 2017). Indeed, the region of Kresy became symbolic of Poland’s past greatness that Piłsudski was reluctant to forego (Kochanski, 2012). Although Lewis Namier, a Pole of Jewish descent had been attributed to the authorship of the Curzon Line, his anti-Polish views of encroachment into Kresy mirrored British Policy towards Poland and had little influence over Lloyd Georges government (Rusin, 2013).
Upper Silesia was predominantly working-class Poles with ethnic German landowners and industrialists that was another friction point for the Entente who ordered a plebiscite to determine the future of territory east of the river Oder to reduce discrimination against the Poles. Propaganda and ‘strong arm’ tactics by both sides and the orchestrated mass migration of Germans threatened any attempt to hold the plebiscites that resulted in a series of uprisings between 1919 and finally in May 1921. The need for Entente troops who were French and sympathetic to the Polish cause, kept some semblance of peace that resulted in the German Wirth government to resign and the Poles response to the League of Nations decision and ratification in October 1921 lacked enthusiasm (Kochanski, 2012).
Piłsudski also exploited the power vacuum in central Europe during the inter-war years where he explored the significant relations between Warsaw and Bratislava over the ‘Slovak Question’ of autonomy (Lewkowicz, 2020) while at the same time annexing Cieszyn in Silesia in 1919, forcing the Entente to intervene and seek a negotiated settlement at the Spa Conference in Belgium in July 1920. However, minor border disputes with Slovakia and the Czech’s continued right up to the outbreak of war (Rees, 2009; Kochanski, 2012; Lewkowicz, 2020).
The complex negotiations based on ethnicity meant not all would remain within their native countries and resulted in the Minorities Treaty that all parties had to sign despite the Jews lobbying for a separate state within Poland (Kochanski, 2012) and other minorities stranded in states they felt little allegiance to. In Keynes’s analysis of the Treaty of Versailles, the root of the Great Depression and handling of minorities would not settle geo-political issues. Bottom (2003: 367) suggested “The catastrophic lose-lose nature of the Versailles Treaty illustrates the way in which complexity necessitates reliance on simplifying heuristics while propagating and amplifying the impact of the bias that is generated”.
The degree of friction caused by complex ethnic boundaries and contested places, ultimately led to the outbreak of war.
Prologue to War
The fledgling parliament (Sejm) passed the Army Law in February 1919 and appointed Jozef Pilsudski as commander – in – chief. The inter-war army was initially a ‘motley-crew’ of units largely made up of prisoners of war from German and Austro-Hungarian army or small political militias (Ascherson, 1987; Zaloga and Madej, 1991). Historically, Poland had provided the elite cavalry for Napoleon and this relationship had ironically been maintained in both the First and Second World Wars.
In France, General Jozef Haller had commanded six divisions of the Polish Army during the 1914 -18 War and other units had been attached to the French Foreign Legion. At the outbreak of war 25,000 Polish-Americans had volunteered to fight in the trenches. These volunteers were trained in Canada while the USA languished in neutrality. (The Haller Army was transferred to Poland in 1919).
The tsarist government had also allowed the formation of a Polish Legion (Pulawy Legion). However, increasing political tension within Russia and fears of growing Polish nationalism, saw it disbanded until the more liberal regime of Kerensky in 1917 enabled the formation of the 1st Polish Eastern Corps and transferred to the front in Byelorussia.
Pilsudski commanded an army trained by its adversaries and commanded by an officer corps drawn largely from the old Austro – Hungarian Empire that led to tension within the armed forces. Many of these units consisted of up to 40% non-Polish ethnic origin (Zaloga and Madej, 1991).
As Poland regained its nationhood, border skirmishes enabled the ‘new army’ to emerge as a more cohesive unit. The 1920 – 21 Polish – Soviet War was a brief but terrifying moment for the whole of Europe (Ascherson, 1987, Stafford, 1997). To numerous observers, the Poles were about to achieve what the White Russians had not – the overthrow of the Bolsheviks (Stafford, 1997).
Churchill had seen and hoped to have funded the campaign by Savinkov, an anti – Tsarist and anti – Bolshevik Russian for a campaign to thwart the rise in communism. The ‘Greens’ or Union for the Defence of the Motherland carried out a series of sabotage operations against rolling stock, ambushing Bolshevik patrols and organized the assassination of leading local Bolsheviks within Russia. Pilsudski supported Savinkov who was unaware that the Cheka had penetrated his organization. White Russians still envisaged Poland being reabsorbed into the Russian Empire and this fundamental political stance negated any support Pilsudski may have given.
In April 1920 Poland supported the Ukrainian nationalist forces and invaded the Ukraine. The operation was so successful with Polish cavalry units pushing towards Kiev that the humiliated Soviets sought retribution. With the White Russian Army quashed, the Soviets pushed the Poles back to the gates of Warsaw. By the end of the summer 1920, Pilsudski had engineered a brilliant counterattack (Zaloga and Madej, 1991) and pushed the Soviets back to the border.
Russian peasant revolts in Tambov and the Kronstadt mutiny caused by famine, forced Lenin to alter his economic ‘reforms’ and with an embarrassing defeat, bided his time. Poland’s military ability did not deter Czechoslovakia from seizing a contested strip of territory near the city of Cieszyn. In the run up to the Second World War, Poland was bordered by neighbourly disputes that appeared unsolvable.
State of the Armed Forces
Much of the First World War’s Eastern Front had been fought over Polish soil. Previous imperial powers had stripped agricultural resources and made no industrial investment apart from a few textile factories in Lodz. The Polish State was in a dire economic situation. While the fledgling democracy had flexed its political and military muscles, the economy was a shambles.
Military training and support came from France. French officers training and theory favoured a strategy of static attrition. To lessen French influence, Pilsudski requested their departure in the late 1920s (Zaloga and Madej, 1991). Political infighting along ethnic and party lines resulted in a coup d’etat in 1926 by Pilsudski. Industrialization in southern Poland had enabled the Poles to produce fighter aircraft (P.7 and P.11) superior to contemporary German and Russian designs, however, these were largely shipped abroad to countries like Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey for foreign exchange earnings to fund the economy. Funding of the armed services represented 10% of the German Luftwaffe’s 1939 budget (Zaloga and Madej, 1991:11)
| Polish Defence Budget 1938 – 1939 | ||
| Service | Millions Zloty | % |
| Military administration | 100 | 12.5 |
| Infantry | 225 | 28.2 |
| Cavalry | 58 | 7.3 |
| National Guard | 7 | 0.9 |
| Artillery | 16 | 2 |
| Armored Force | 13.7 | 1.7 |
| Engineers | 8.9 | 1.1 |
| Communications | 5.1 | 0.6 |
| Quartermaster | 1.8 | 0.2 |
| Air Force | 46.3 | 5.8 |
| Navy | 21.7 | 2.7 |
| Industrial preparations | 6 | 0.7 |
| Research and Training | 30 | 3.8 |
| Reservist stipends | 8 | 1 |
| Rail and road transport | 15 | 1.9 |
| Construction | 22 | 2.7 |
| Reserve supplies | 197 | 24.7 |
| Salaries | 16 | 2 |
Source: Zaloga and Madej, 1991:13
While Poland began updating its armed forces, its budgets were modest and suffered from defence budgets being postponed until the mid 1940s. Unfortunately, this set back modernization by at least a generation for all key strategic weaponry.
Strategic and Operational Doctrine
The Polish Armed Forces (Polskie Sily Zbrojne) or PSZ incorporated the Polish Army and Polish navy. The Polish Airforce was part of the army, but was distinguished by its own uniform and command structures. After 1926 the organization of the PSZ was on a peculiar two-track system devised by Pilsudski (Zaloga and Madej, 1991) in order to cope with war and peacetime operations. Like all armies during peace, PSZ war games and strategic planning simulated invasions from the Germany (Plan N) or from Soviet invasion (Plan R). The Poles even simulated a two front invasion (Plan N + R). In each scenario, the role and support of the French and Romanians were critical to any success or survival, therefore, all the post 1918 conventions with these countries encompassed strategic support being put into action should invasion occur.
In March 1939 the Pole estimated they would be facing an invasion of 70 German divisions. The PSZ field structure is set out in the following table:
| Army Unit | Commander | Type | Position |
| Army Modlin | Gen. Emil Krukowicz-Przedrzymirski | 2 infantry divisions,2 cavalry brigades | Border with E. Prussia |
| Special Operational Group Narew (SGO Narew) | Gen. Czeslaw Mlot-Fijalkowski | 2 infantry divisions,2 cavalry brigades | Protect right flank of Army Modlin |
| Wyszkow Reserve | 3 infantry divisions | Support to Army Modlin and SGO Narew | |
| Army Pomorze | Gen. Wladyslaw Bortnowski | 5 infantry divisions 1 cavalry brigade | Defence of Pomeranian Corridor |
| Army Poznan | Gen. Tadeusz Kutrzeba | 4 infantry divisions 2 cavalry brigades | Frontier and flanks of Pomerania and Silesia |
| Army Lodz | Gen. Juliusz Rommel 5 infantry divisions | 2 cavalry brigades | Central Poland |
| Army Krakow | Gen. Antoni Szylling | 2 infantry divisions 10th Mechanized Brigade | Upper Silesia and S. Poland bordering Slovakia |
| Army Prusy | Polish High Command | 7 infantry divisions 1 cavalry brigade 2 tank battalions | Central Front |
| Army Karpaty | Gen, Kazimierz Fabrycy | 2 infantry divisions of reserves | Carpathian region |
| Polish Airforce | Gen. Jozef Zajac | Bomber Brigade (90) Pursuit Brigade (120) | Support Army Defence of Warsaw |
| AA Units | Major cities | ||
| Polish Navy | Destroyer Flotilla (4) Submarine Flotilla (5) |
Source: Zaloga and Madej, 1991:28
According to Zaloga and Madej (1991) the Polish fighting doctrine as to split the armies into two smaller operational units, fight at night and use improvisation in order to counteract numerical weakness. Tactically, this approach was more akin to the Franco – Prussian War rather than an army about to face the Blitzkrieg. Each army was to cover up to a 200Km front with each infantry division covering 12 to 25 Km depending upon terrain and the opposition’s tactics. The main defensive belt would be 2 Km deep with conventional linear defences. The cavalry would provide scouting and a mobile defence for up to 9 Km in front as a screen to the main defences. Artillery would typically be positioned about 3 Km behind the main defensive curtain.
The September Campaign
Analysis of the September Campaign is all too easy with hindsight. Liddell Hart (1970) expounded the proposition that the Poles should have made its main fortifications behind the Vistula and San, abandoning the country’s main industrial area. He saw the Poles military strategy as being over weighted by pride and an over-confident military making their planning unreal by placing huge concentrations in the ‘corridor’ and ill-equipped to deal with a mechanized war. The German campaign learned lessons from its Polish campaign on the use of armoured forces and close air support for ground troops that would be used in later campaigns against the western Allies, the Balkan states, and Soviet Russia (Kennedy, 1996). It was not an easy victory, and the Germans took heavier casualties than the longer campaign in France (Ascherson, 1987).
By the end of August 1939, Poland had secretly being mobilizing its army to a strength of 700,000. On 25th August the Wehrmacht despatched orders for ‘Case White’ (invasion of Poland), unfortunately, the negotiations between Hitler and Mussolini were not going well, therfore the orders were rescinded, but not all units received them in time. Border raids by the Abwehr, increases in reconnaissance flights and an intrusion at the Jablonka Pass were noted and not necessarily acted upon by the Poles, not through ‘over-confidence’ as Liddell Hart saw it, but through sheer inability due to lack of resources and communication equiment. The Germans did not achieve tactical surprise as many English and German historians would us believe (Zaloga and Madej,1991) since German ciphers had been read prior to the war.
On the 30th August 1939, Marshal Rydz-Smigly put the country on war footing. The Navy was instructed to activate Operation Pekin. The destroyer flotilla left for Britain and had time to clear the Danish Straits before war was declared. General Mobilization had to be delayed in order to meet agreements with Britain and France not to inflame the diplomatically tense situation. To may historians, this action has been interpreted as the Poles being taken by surprise. The Wehrmacht were going to war on the 1st September irrespective of what the Poles, English or French thought or did. When General Mobilization took place, the English and French protested despite the evidence supporting the presence of a massed German army on its borders. The Poles were outnumbered by about 10:1 (Ascherson, 1987). For Lieutenant – General Anders, the opening stages of the war had an element of irony. As the commander of the Novogrodek Cavalry Brigade based at Lidzbark, just a few kilometres from Grunewald, where in 1410 the Poles achieved a brilliant victory over the Teutonic Knights, Anders knew the defence of Poland was hopeless.
On the 31st August, the Polish Airforce was ordered to disperse to secret airfields. Hitler correctly anticipated the poor response by the English and French and issued the armed forces to be deployed for Case White. No one knows why Smigly -Rydz thought England or France would come to immediate assistance – they had indicated a two week period would be needed for France to mount a full counter offensive. Smigly -Rydz also did not heed the Pilsudskian policy of considering measures for the defence against the Soviets.
1st September 1939
At 04.30 Stuka dive-bombers prematurely bombed the bridge at Tczew in the Pomeranian Corridor. SS troops dressed in Polish uniforms attacked the radio station at Gleiwitz and broadcast inflammatory statements urging Polish minorities to take up arms against Hitler. This incident was part of Reinhard Heydrich’s order to the SD to ‘manufacture’ minor, but inflammatory incidents along the border to provoke the Poles which was of great concern to both Britain and France (Williamson, 2009; Moorhouse, 2019). For a touch of realism, several bodies of concentration inmates dressed in Polish uniforms, were left behind as ‘evidence’ for journalists (Zaloga and Madej, 1991) to report on.
The Free City of Danzig was heavily shelled and bombed, inflicting heavy casualties upon the civilian population and military coastal defences or navy flotillas. In Danzig, the defenders, particularly civilian volunteers were shot. The Army Pomorze faced the 4th Army whose tactic was to isolate them in the north from the rest of the Polish Forces and then link up with the Third Army and attack Warsaw.
Daylong fighting produced at times, scenes of sheer heroism. The Pomorska Cavalry Brigade had been in contacts with the German 20th Motorized Infantry Division. Colonel Masterlarz had half the unit mount up and attempted a surprise attack from the rear. Catching an infantry battalion by surprise in a woodland clearing, the sabre attack wiped them out. Legends and myths were borne of cavalry units taking on armoured vehicles. However, what is forgotten, is that the cavalry units carried anti-tank weapons for rapid deployment (Zaloga and Madej, 1991).
On the Prussian Front the German Third Army broke through defences to the north of Warsaw. Ground attacks started at 05.00 and aimed to knock out the heavy fortifications at Mlawa. It was on this front that the Polish Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade had a number of sabre clashes with the German First Cavalry Brigade (Zaloga and Madej,1991) thus marking an end to mounted warfare. The Polish Special Operational Group Narew had virtually no contacts with German forces due to the restraining action of the Polish Third Army and therefore effectively denied rapid gains on this front.
The heaviest fighting took place in the Southwest, a front covered by Army Lodz and further south, Army Krakow. Army Poznan in the centre saw little action or contact on the first day of fighting. The German Eighth and Tenth Armies pushed through the massive densely forested areas with major infantry clashes en route. The Wolynska Cavalry Brigade successfully countered attacks by the German 4th Panzer Division whose poor co-ordination in attack delayed advance and lost equipment. This front was geographicaly the most diverse and faced the largest concentration of mechanized troops. The heaviest fighting was around the industrial zone of Katowice. In the south, the 44th and 45th Infantry Divisions attacked throught the Jablonkow Pass near Karwina and Cieszyn which were lightly defended. In the southern mountainous area, the XXII Panzer Corps attacked just below Nowy Targ at the Dunajec river which was defended by the 1st KOP Regiment and National Guard Zakopane Battalion. Army Krakow was forced to commit support to stem the attack which was temporarily held.
Outflanked and harassed by German guerrilla units, Army Krakow had to deal with many armed German units set up by the Abwehr to carry out sabotage.
Once the Germans broke through the various fronts, poor communications impeded any chance of reforming on a grand scale. From the 10th until 18th September Polish units were able to reform quickly and still were able to harass and inflict serious damage. For field commanders like Anders, confusion and contradictory orders added to the pain and humiliation of the inevitable defeat. Units attempted to move south-east despite heavy co-ordinated artillery bombardments. Soldiers and civilians who were able to bear arms bravely defended and resisted for as long as possible as they moved behind the Vistula. Encirclement began and 60,000 troops were destroyed at Radom. Partisan units were organized and regular army units kept moving southeast in order to gain supplies of food and munitions and regroup to avoid annihilation once the Russians entered the war on 17th September.
Soviet Invasion
The Soviet invasion was not well synchronized along the 1,400 Km border which started at 02:00 and 04:00 on 17th September 1939 (Williamson, 2009). The Soviet invasion was under the pretext of protecting the ethnic minorities in Eastern Galicia since the Polish Government had collapsed (Kochanski, 2012; Rogalski, 2017) even though it had relocated to its south-eastern border with Romania (Williamson, 2009). Defending the eastern frontier was an army of 100-150,00 troops poorly armed and largely made up of reservists and members of KOP, the border militia who fought on since there was little option in negotiating a safe passage to Romania (Williamson, 2009). Voroshilov’s ‘Lightning War’ may not have met widespread Polish defence; however, the Soviets met some significant engagements that highlighted overconfident leadership, poor planning, and inadequate logistical support (Hill, 2014). While the Soviet army had been partially mobilised, the speed of the German advances shocked the Soviets (Moorhouse, 2019).
Anders, the charismatic Brigadier-General who led the Nowogródek Cavalry Brigade was sent to the eastern front to support the 20th Infantry Division which was already in retreat (Moorhouse, 2019). In action near Mińsk, Anders Brigade became entangled in the Polish high command’s confusion and headed towards Lublin. On 22nd September the Brigade charged the German forces at Krasnobród with some success forcing the Germans to retreat before the German 17th Cavalry Regiment counter attacked (Moorhouse, 2019). The short-lived victory at Krasnobród enabled many Polish units to escape southwards while Anders became squeezed between Soviet and German advances. One final charge outside Broszki to the west of Lwów routed the German 28th Infantry Regiment capturing the entire battalion before Anders pressed on towards the Hungarian border. At Zastówka, having sneaked past the Soviets, exhausted, starving and run out of ammunition, Anders surrendered his unit in the belief the Soviets might give them passage to Hungary that was just 20 Km away.
Lwów had been under severe bombardment by the German forces and the spirited defence of the city led by General Langner was acknowledged for their valour and bravery when a cannister contained call to surrender was dropped on the city (Kochanski, 2012). On 20th September 1939 the bombardment ceased due to the imminent arrival of the Soviet Army led by Colonel Ivanov. Colonel Kazimierz Ryziński surrendered the city to the Soviets under the impression they were allies (Williamson, 2009; Kochanski, 2012) amid confusion that also saw the fortress at Brześć surrender. General Langer and the Chief of Staff having rejected the German demands to surrender, negotiated an agreement with the Soviets for all troops in Lwów to surrender at 15:00 on 22nd September that would allow ordinary ranks (OR) to return home and allow officers to cross the border into Romania, essentially completing Rydz-Śmigley’s orders. Instead, the Soviets rounded up the officers and transported them in appalling conditions to a prison camp in Starobielsk and murdered at Katyn between April and May 1940 with ordinary ranks transported to Siberia (Williamson, 2009; Kochanski, 2012; Rogalski, 2017).
On 21-28th September the German and Soviet armies moved towards the demarcation line based on the Rivers Narew, Vistula, and San with minor skirmishes. Although Hitler had wanted to requisition Polish oil fields, Ribbentrop attempted to claim them for the Reich much to Stalin’s annoyance (Williamson, 2009) that resulted in Ribbentrop settling the matter on a trip to Moscow on 27th September that saw the border re-drawn along the Rivers Narew, Bug and extended down to the Ruthenian border with Drohobycz and Lwów in Soviet territory and some 4.5m Poles in Soviet hands (Williamson, 2009). Through late September through to 6th October 1939 any resistance was quelled with the final units of the Polish 7th, 39th Reserve and 41st Reserve units captured. General Anders whose units pushed for the Hungarian border were intercepted by the Soviets near Sambor with General Anders imprisoned in Lwów before being transported to the Lubyanka until he was released in July 1941.
Field commanders moved as many of the remnants of the army to an escape route which led to Romania and Hungary. Units breached German lines on 22nd September before Soviet troops blocked all routes. Some units retreated westwards to escape the Soviets with Special Operational Polesie Group under General Kleeburg fought off the Soviets and took on the German 13th Motorized Division when they crossed the river Bug (Williamson, 2009) and finally ceased action on 6th October due to lack of ammunition.
Poland finally fell on the 6th October as the last organized resistance was crushed at Hel and Kock. Zaloga and Madej (1991) estimated the Germans took 587,000 prisoners and the Soviets 200,000. Anders (1949) estimated between 200 – 300,000 escaped into Romania and Hungary through the Dukla Pass. Those who were caught by the Soviets may have been far higher (Anders, 1949). Fiedotov, an NKVD general estimated it to be nearer 475,000.
A memo dated 24.06.1941 by General Sikorski confirmed what was known. About 200,000 POW’s and many civilian deportees of military age was confirmed by Krasnaya Zvezda in October 1940. The camps contained:
- General 10
- Colonels 72
- Lt. Colonels 52
- Junior Officers 9,227
- O.R’s – 181,223
Deportees were most likely to be Poles including women and children numbered over a million.
Known POW camps were located at:
- Starobielsk near Charkov
- Kozielsk near Smolensk
- Sverdlovsk near the Urals
- Aktiubinsk in the southern Urals
- Krasnoyarsk in Siberia
Deportation Areas were listed as:
- Semipalatinsk on the Irtysh
- Pavlordarsk on the Irtysh
- Mariinsk north-west of Novosibirsk
- Aktiubinsk in the southern Urals
- Irkutsh
- Vologda
The deportees were kept in labour camps and the memo identified the future possible uses and routes the deportees might take and Sikorski indicated the most viable option would be to develop a Polish Army on Soviet soil, however at the time of writing Sikorski stated the diplomatic conditions would postpone this option. However, if all those arrested including White Russians, Jews and political prisoners, the number was between 1.5 and 1.6m people. Transported to the Gulags, few survived.
The final strongholds at Modlin and the garrison on the Hel Peninsula valiantly fought on after the surrender of Warsaw on 29th September. Modlin had withstood the German attack on 24th September and held out for a further 5 days. The Hel Peninsula was battered by artillery and the battleships Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesien and held out as the inferno of daily shelling continued until 2nd October when the commander Vice-Admiral Józef Unrug capitulated as their position was no longer tenable.
Outside the Polish Government in exile circles, Poland was to become problematic to the Allies. The exiled Polish Government sought guarantees for Poland’s future while its troops fought bravely for the allied cause based upon a perceived debt Churchill’s government should honour but could not be discharged due to the massive Soviet war effort (Prazmowska, 1995).
One of Poland’s greatest gifts towards the war effort was to have captured an Ultra machine (Stafford, 1997) early in the conflict. The true value of this encryption machine was instantly recognised by Polish and French codebreakers. Unfortunately, true recognition of its significance came later, and the thanks given to the Poles hardly covers couple of sentences in either archives or in historical text until recently.
Selected Reading
Acherson, N. (1987) The Struggles for Poland, Michael Joseph, London.
Anders, W (1949) An Army In Exile: The Story Of The Second Polish Corps, Macmillan & co, London
Bottom, W.P. (2003) “Keynes’ Attack on the Versailles Treaty: An Early Investigation of the Consequences of Bounded Rationality, Framing, and Cognitive Illusions”, International Negotiation, No.8 pp. 367-402.
Hill, A. (2014) “Voroshilov’s ‘Lightening War’ – The Soviet Invasion of Poland, September 1939”, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol.27, No. 3, pp.404-419.
Kennedy, R.M. (1996) “The German Campaign in Poland (1939)”, Department of the Army Pamphlet, No.20 – 255, USA.
Lewkowicz, Ł. (2020) “THE POLICY OF THE PIŁSUDSKI’S CAMP TOWARDS THE SLOVAK QUESTION (1918–1939), POLITYKA OBOZU PIŁSUDCZYKOWSKIEGO WOBEC KWESTII SŁOWACKIEJ (1918–1939), Athenaeum, Vol. 68, No. 4, pp. 121- 136.
McGilvray, E. (2018) “Ander’s Army: General Władysław Anders & the Polish Second Corps 1941-46”, Pen and Sword Books, UK.
Moorhouse, R. (2019) “First to Fight: The Polish War 1939”, The Bodley Head, UK
Paczkowski, A. (2003) “The Spring Will Be Ours: Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom”, Pennsylvania State University, USA.
Prazmowska, A.J. (1995) “Britain and Poland 1939-1943: The Betrayed Ally”, Cambridge, Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Series No. 97.
Rees, L. (2009) “World War II Behind Closed Doors: Stalin, The Nazis and The West”, BBC Books, UK.
Rogalski, W. (2017) “Divided Loyalty: Britain’s Polish Ally During the Second World War”, Helion & Co. UK.
Rusin, B. (2013) “Lewis Namier, the Curzon Line, and the shaping of Poland’s eastern frontier after World War I”, Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, XLVIII, pp. 5-23.
Stafford, D (1997) “Churchill and Secret Service”, John Murray, UK
