Introduction
Captain Jan Górski and Captain Maciej Kalenkiewicz understood the need for occupied Poland to be supported from the outside in updated equipment, communications, and specialists to wager clandestine warfare in the preplanning of an uprising against the Germans (Lorys, 1993; Rogalski, 2022). Despite their plans being initially rejected, the support of Jan Jaźwiński was instrumental in finally being received by General Sosnowski. They were endorsed by him with a request through General Jając for parachute training to commence with the newly formed parachute brigade. Jan Górski and Captain Maciej Kalenkiewicz were transferred to General Sosnowski’s office to develop their concept further which later became incorporated into Sikorski’s plans for covert operations in Poland on 20th September 1940 (Lorys, 1993, Grabowski, 2013, Rogalski, 2022) which included the concept of an uprising.
For the ‘unseen and silent’ to survive in the field, a new approach to training was adopted. As Irenek-Osmecki (1954: 10) observed, for the ‘wily fox’ to survive they must become a daring saboteur, first class shot, an agile all-in fighter, a watchful observer and finally a good parachutist.
Britain:
Parachute and glider training had been introduced during the inter-war years and based in Bydgoszcz, Jabłonna-Legionowo, Biała Podlaska and Bezmiechowa with parachute training being incorporated into the physical training of Officer Cadet Schools and selected Non-Commissioned Officer Schools in 1936 (Lorys, 1993). Each school had towers built for controlled descents. The courses included clandestine training for operations behind enemy lines, and such was their success in military exercises in 1938 that a parachute training centre was created in Bydgoszcz (Wojskowy Ośrodek Spadochronowy or WOS) (Lorys, 1993). At the outbreak of war, the base was evacuated east to an airfield at Małaszewicze near Brześć, close to the river Bug.
Senior officers based in Scotland since 1940 began screening units for suitable candidates from the armed services who were being re-organised into a modern army based on British lines after the debacle of Narvik where the Polish contribution was largely overlooked by the British (Kochanski, 2012). (Hyperlink: Norwegian Campaign). The candidates were in temporary camps close to ports and based in temporary camps under canvas in former parks, golf courses and open land mainly on the east and south-east coasts (Irenek-Osmecki, 1954; Pruszynski, 2010). The initial candidates were selected, then interviewed by an officer sent from the Polish forces HQ based in the Rubens Hotel in London (Irenek-Osmecki, 1954). Those who were successful were transferred to ‘unspecified duties’ attached to the newly formed and very secret Polish VI Bureau (Irenek-Osmecki, 1954, Rogalski, 2022).
Since the outbreak of war and the collapse of the Polish army in September 1939, Captain Jan Górski and Captain Maciej Kalenkiewicz understood the need for occupied Poland to be supported from the outside in updated equipment, communications, and specialists to wager clandestine warfare in the preplanning of an uprising against the Germans (Lorys, 1993; Rogalski, 2022). Despite their plans being initially rejected, the support of Jan Jaźwiński was instrumental in finally being received by General Sosnowski. They were endorsed by him with a request through General Jając for parachute training to commence with the newly formed parachute brigade. Jan Górski and Captain Maciej Kalenkiewicz were transferred to General Sosnowski’s office to develop their concept further which later became incorporated into Sikorski’s plans for covert operations in Poland on 20th September 1940 (Lorys, 1993, Grabowski, 2013, Rogalski, 2022) which included the concept of an uprising (See The Warsaw Rising)
For the ‘unseen and silent’ to survive in the field, a new approach to training was adopted. As Irenek-Osmecki (1954: 10) observed, for the ‘wily fox’ to survive they must become a daring saboteur, first class shot, an agile all-in fighter, a watchful observer and finally a good parachutist.
The camps were secret and relatively isolated with all courses designed to build skills, stamina and meet the needs of the AK in the field which resulted in periodic changes to course content which was designed by the Polish 6th Detachment of the General Staff (Oddział VI Sztabu Naczelnego Wodza) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE).
Typically, the initial courses focussed on physical conditioning, self-sufficiency, and resourcefulness to ‘live off the land’ while cross-country runs for further conditioning in the Scottish Highlands and unarmed combat, paramilitary training, small weapons training, or demolition skills honed the combat skills needed for missions. These skills also included ability to ‘blend-in’, follow targets or shake off being followed within civilian scenarios and develop observation skills of troop and shipping movements. Fines were levied on poor performance skills or failure to sneak into accommodation without being caught (Irenek-Osmecki, 1954; Valentine 2004; Rogalski, 2022). Some were caught and arrested by British Police on these exercises and were required to spin a cover story or lie without giving away their role (Irenek-Osmecki, 1954, Rogalski, 2022, Turner, 2022).
At Leven, like Manchester Ringway (Śledziński, 2012), there was a parachute training camp where the Monkey’s Wood and parachute tower was used to develop skills and ability to respond to the jump commands and avoid injury (Śledziński, 2012). The real jumps started from tethered balloons (as they do today) from 700 ft and practiced forward, backwards or crosswind parachute landings according to the conditions of the day before the real jump from an airplane that could be in single or multiple drops. Fatalities and broken limbs were not uncommon (Irenek-Osmecki, 1954; Valentine, 2004). Completion of parachute training and paramilitary skills enabled the candidates to move onto to more specialist courses in communications, codes, espionage, demolition, and leading operations mainly based at Audley End where the training was adapted to mission needs (Valentine, 2004; Śledziński, 2012; Rogalski, 2022; Turner, 2022). On completion, the successful candidates swore an oath.
Cichociemni often chose short pseudonyms as ‘keys’ to speed up their transmissions in Morse, cutting down on transmission time to reduce detection. Couriers chose names to conceal their identity with fake documents produced at STS XIV (Turner, 2022).
Location of Training Centres:
The training camps were located at:
• Inverlochy Castle, Fort William
• STS 25a Garramor House Paramilitary training
• STS XIV (then 38) Briggens House, Stanstead Abbotts () Forgery, deception, and training for guerrilla warfare
• STS 43 Audley End
• STS 46 Chigley Hall, Newport Pagnell
• Largo House (Monkey Wood, Monkey Grove, or Monkey Paradise)
• Leven: parachute training had the first tower constructed by Polish engineers
• Ringway (Manchester) for Parachute training (led by Lt. Jerzy Góecki and Lt. Julian Gęgołyś)
• Ostuni (Italy) near Brindisi which was used as a transfer site to Poland in 1944 and completion of training (Code B10 in training files)
• STS 102 Mont Carmel, RAF Ramat David for parachute training and holding camp at Athlit (Hoffman, 2015) for Polish paratroopers designated for the Balkans
Holding Stations were located at:
• STA 18 Frogmore farm, Aston, Herts.
• STA 19 Gardener’s End, Ardley near Stevenage
• STA 20a Pollards Park House, Chalfont St. Giles
• and 20b Pollards Wood Grange, Chalfont St. Giles
Middle East:
The main SOE station was based in Cairo (M.E. 46) at Rustum Buildings, Kasr el-Aini Street and took over control of Polish operations in December 1941 under the leadership of Col. Peter Wilkinson. The Poles had established operations in Jerusalem in the autumn of 1940 with the setting up of Station ‘T’.
Station ‘T’ acted as a hub for other stations within the region, for example Station ‘Bałk’ in Istanbul acted as an intermediary for military attachés to Yugoslavia and Greek governments who were exiled in Cairo (Ciechanowski, 2005). It also recruited personnel for special missions into the Balkans and candidates would complete their training at STS 102/ ME 102 based at Mount Carmel, a former monestary near Haifa for operations in the Balkans and northern Italy (Hyperlink: https://www.polandinexile.com/exile6b.htm). The station also include a cryptology section and a radio-intelligence registry (Ciechanowski, 2005). By March 1944 the station had cells operation in Tel Aviv (No. 1) and Cairo (No. 2 or Tartar) which operated independently, but with consent from the British authorities.
Polish agents were sent to a monastery on Mount Carmel, neat Haifa (M.E. 102 and STC 102) for training where paramilitary training was at Megiddo near Mishmar Haemek and weapons training at Atlit, a former Crusader castle on the coast. Parachute training was at RAF Ramat David.
Other cells existed under diplomatic cover in Tehran (No. 5), Baghdad (No. 6) and Beirut (No. 3) all of whom reported to Jerusalem (No. 1) (Ciechanowski, 2005). ‘T’ Station employed in March 1944 36 officers, 13 NCOs, 15 civilians and 21 female volunteers from the PWSK, 6 clerks, 20 radio-telegraphic operators supported by 5 technicians, 2 laboritory assistants and 4 drivers (Ciechanowski, 2005). Despite reorganisation in the spring of 1944, the role of the staion covering counterintelligence activities and assessing the Soviet attempts to penetrate both Polish and Jewish intelligence networks continued. Their activities included seeking intelligence on post war political direction the Jewish and pan-Arab underground parties would take. By the war’s conclusion there were cells in Greece (No. 8) and cell No. 3 now included Syria with cell No. 5 covering Tehran.
The Women’s Auxiliary Services (PWSK or Pomocnicza Służba Kobiet) were also seconded to the Polish Signals Corps and Military Intelligence in a variety of roles, particularly W/T, censorship and cipher operations. They were assigned to posts in Tehran, Baghdad, Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo and Qassassin (Dzierżek, 1995). Towards the end of the war, their role was enhanced to focus on education and skills provision for peacetime roles (See: Polish Women at War).
Polish counterintelligence ‘housed’ those suspected of espionage at a special camp set up at Mazra’a (al-Mazra) (Patek, 2023) situated between Acre and Nahariyya in northern Israel. The camp was used for other nationals too and a total of seven camps were spread around Palestine (Patek, 2023).
North Africa:
The crucial role of Agence Africa that has been in the past substantially overlooked has had its place in history to be re-affirmed to a wider audience and give it credit for the outstanding effort II Bureau made, particularly its role in Operation TORCH, the allied landings in North Africa in November 1942 (Ciechanowski, 2005). Operation TORCH essentially blocked the Axis powers out of northern and western Africa and limiting the ability to launch an attack on the Atlantic coast of the USA from the Mediterranean (Anon, 1942).
In the spring of 1941, Słowikowski (Rygor) arrived in North Africa to set up a clandestine organisation for obtaining military information through Vichy contacts sympathetic to the Allies at Algiers (Bennett, 2005; Słowikowski, 2010; Rankin, 2017). SIS turned to II Bureau to help develop the network using Poles from Vichy France to set up Station F and Agence Africa which was fully operational by July 1941 with Capt. Jekiel and Lt. Stanisław Rombejko covering Casablanca to Tripoli. While the posts were land-based, Capt. Pierre Lamy captain of the coaster Forfait provided shipping information and Polish operated feluccas out of Gibraltar provided transport for personnel and agents into France and north Africa while also providing a much-needed escape line for POWs and refugees.
By the time operation TORCH commenced, Agence Africa had outposts in Oran (commanded by Capt. Robert Ragache), Tunis (commanded by Maxime de Roquemaure), Setif (commanded by André Achiary), Algiers (commanded by Maurice Escoute), Philippeville (commanded by Michel Kokoczyński), Constantine (commanded by Paul Schmitt), Bône (Denis Pucheu), Dakar and Agadir (Słowikowski, 2010). Such was the extent of their network, it played a major role in the planning of Operation TORCH for the invasion of Algeria and Morocco in November 1942 having compiled detailed reports on coastal defence networks, troops deployments and their strength (Pepłoński, 2005; Słowikowski, 2010; Kochanski, 2012).
Gibraltar:
A motley crew of Poles and Czech’s manned two 20-ton feluccas, the Seawolf (and later joined by Seadog) and Dogfish operating out of Gibraltar by EU/P section of SOE during WWII flying neutral flags of convenience (Portuguese or Moroccan) (Hyperlink: https://www.polandinexile.com/feluccas.html). The ships were rough, small, and slow (Dixon, 2020) where there was no space for any leisure activities like deck quoits or sun-loungers for their passengers and therefore making them ideal for clandestine operations navigating the calanques in southern France, but also prone to heavy maintenance in Gibraltar’s naval dockyards. They were able to ferry to and from the south coast of France or North Africa, dropping off stores and agents for F Section of SOE or the Polish section E/UP.
Their prime role was the infiltration and extraction of agents, rescuing allied aircrews who had completed their journey through France in escape lines southwards and assisting others needing to escape from North Africa. The evacuation of interned Polish soldiers in the Vichy was under the direction of Stanisław Szewalski through SOE’s base in Gibraltar and Oran in Algeria with some support from a clandestine organisation ‘Reseau d’Astier’ and sympathetic French officers (Pepłoński, 2005) with II Bureau taking over operations in the spring 1942. The Polish route through to the south coast of France was preferable despite administrative issues with paperwork and poor management of the evacuation line to Spain.
They had a major role in supporting Agence Africa and its contribution to intelligence gathering prior to Operation TORCH in November 1942 (Poles, feluccas, Gibraltar and SOE page).
Massingham:
Set on the beautiful and tranquil coast of Algeria, Le Club de Pin had been a ‘watering hole’ for the wealthy during the inter-war period with its bungalows set in beautiful grounds surrounded by bougainvillea, offering seclusion for its guests (Dixon, 2020). After Operation TORCH, the site was requisitioned for a training and an operational base for infiltration of agents initially into Corsica and France by SOE, OSS, Frances’s BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignement et d’ Action) and the Polish VI Bureau. Due to the geopolitics of the region, SOE and OSS would cooperate with their Free French counterparts (Wales, 2005) to develop an effective scheme for infiltration of agents through their training, W/T skills, demolition, weapons instruction and field-craft.
The full title was Massingham Advanced Operational Base (Gregory, 2022) and located near Guyotville in Sidi Ferruch, west of Algiers. The camp had an indoor shooting range, a series of ranges laid out in the dunes and fuselages for parachute training with drop zones along the coastal dunes (Gregory, 2022) that were later moved to near Staouéli in the Zéralda District. The camp also included an array of weapons in the armoury for inspection and training and any scrap vehicles for demolition practice. W/T training was also provided based on STS 52’s syllabus. Nearby at Cabon Lou-Lou for naval training for beach landings, embarkation and use of rubber dinghies and Folbots. Just down the coast was Camp 14 at Moretti Plage for induction training with Camp 6 at Chrea which later acted as a ‘finishing School’ for OSS (Gregory, 2022).
Dixon (2020) suggested that the SOE’s Country Sections were trained together through pooling resources and skills. However, the Polish VI Bureau and its SOE counter-part E/ UP had a greater degree of independence and their own resources for training the Cichociemni in Britain at Station 43 (Audley End House). Their initial war efforts were to concentrate on CONTINENTAL ACTION (Akcja Kontynentalna) using specially equipped bases in Scotland and England (See: Polish Intelligence/ Continental Action) for the training of agents to be dropped into France and Poland. France first ops.
SOE set up a forward base MARYLAND initially in Brindisi and then moved the base to Monopoli too as the Allies pushed further up the Italian Peninsula (Ogden, 2011; Tudor, 2011).
Italy – TORMENT (M.E. 48)
The overall commander was Lt. Col. Arthur Roper-Caldbeck (M.P.20), former head of training at Camp X (STS 103) in Canada until 1942. The Polish operation was designated Force 139 (TORMENT) and commanded by Maj. Jan Jaźwiński “Sopia”. VI Bureau (Base 11) was under the command of Lt. Col. Marian Dorotycz-Malewicz (Richard Hańcza, Roch) who from 29th August 1944 took over the entire command. Although based in ‘Brindisi’ (Garlinski, 1969) Base 11 was located at Campo Casale airfield housed the unit commanders, warehouses, workshops and operations briefing area. Base 10 was established in Ostuni where the Cichociemni were trained in an abandoned sanatorium and the courses that lasted up to six weeks. The training courses were based on the established training programme for the Cichociemni in Britain. During this period, the candidates learned their ‘legend’ of their assumed identity and interrogated by instructors to ensure they had mastered it before being issued civilian clothes and false identity papers.
Parachute training at San Vito dei Normanni, just 13km from Brindisi was a smaller upgraded grass airfield by the Luftwaffe in 1943. Paramilitary training was based at Castello di Santo Stefano, Monopoli to the north of Ostuni where there was a fortified complex of requisitioned buildings to cover their needs (Stafford, 2011) and away from prying eyes. The ‘Capri’ Base organised courier communications to Poland and the recruitment of conscripted Poles into the Wehrmacht to bolster II Corps. Units of II Corps were temporarily billeted at San Vito dei Normanni too.
The main camps for the Polish II Corps (2 Korpus Polski) numbering 55,000 men and women landed in Taranto and were transferred to base camps at Bari and Brindisi with a tank training facility at San Basilio and Metra on Sherman tanks. This was for the Reserve Armoured Troops Centre of II Corps. The unit was commanded by Lt. Col. Szostak.
For the training school in Ostuni in Italy the total number of agents was 173. Of which 23 were sent into the field, 10 were lodged in a holding station ready for deployment with 12 working on the base. Unsuitable for deployment 36 and fully trained, but not deployed was 50 and this group were transferred to Polish II Corps. A further 39 were sent to Britain for further training and only 3 died in operations (TNA/ HS7-184).
There was a ‘holding station’ in Laureto near Taranto for forwarding personnel to their assigned units or missions. Another holding station (Military Establishment 56) was located at Monopoli.
The 3rd General Hospital was based at Palagiano near Taranto with the 5th Field Hospital at Casamassima near Bari.
The offices of the Polish Intelligence was at 6 Via Califati, Bari while the British No.1 Special Forces C.M.F, were at 27 Via Cairoli, Bari (TNA/ HS4-266).
Campo Casale, Brindisi 1943
Source: forgottenairfields.com
San Vito dei Normanni airfield 1943
Source: Forgottenairfields.com
Aerial View of Castello di Santo Stefano used for Paramilitary Training
Source: Diceglie (2023)
Layout of the Castello
Source: Diceglie (2023)
Communications were initially at Latiano and then established at Mesagne where the radio liaison branch set up stations Zora, Mewa and Jutrenka in direct contact with London’s VI Bureau, the C-in-C, AK HQ in Warsaw and the Air Transfer Departments of the AK Districts in Poland.
The bases were largely focussed on the commissioning of special operations to Poland but also included the Balkans. The Poles had a degree of independence from the British SOE operations that led to some ‘frictions’ between the two over resourcing and logistics of flights into Poland in support of the AK and the Warsaw Rising (TNA/ HS4-184; TNA HS6/ 776; Garlinski, 1969).
After the Italian armistice, the role of SOE altered since the political activities were redundant. Polish missions that encourage mass desertion of Polish and Czech soldiers conscripted into the Wehrmacht in the Balkans, were scaled back in late February 1945 due to the shortage of resources to accommodate them (TNA/ HS6-766). Despite PLO’s being seconded to SOE missions and SOE wanting to incorporate the Poles into their own operations due to manpower shortages (TNA/ HS6-766), any friction arose through manpower shortages and pressure to support Poland while at the same time covering operations into the Balkans. .VI Bureau handed subversion work over to the Polish II Corps with Colonel Władysław Michniewicz, head of II Corps intelligence, taking control.
In the beginning of January 1944 when 1586 Special Duties Flight became established in Brindisi (Campo Casale), played a key role in the Warsaw ‘Rising’ later in the year (Cynk, 1998; Rogalski, 2022). The unit was officially named as the Polish Operations Section Airborne Troops. They also worked as a pooled resource with RAF 148 Squadron so that the operations were effective in covering Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy and the Balkans. The site also was under ME 57 Air Preparation Facility and the Poles used their own packing stations for supply drops rather than use the facilities at M.E. 54 ‘Paradise Camp’ at Brindisi for Force 133 (TNA/HS4-184; Rogalski, 2022) before moving base to Foggia.
Later, an outpost was setup in Siena (Gregory, 2022) before moving to Ancona (TNA/ HS6/ 776). The level of SOE operations in the summer of 1944 put a huge strain on resources that required supplementary staff to be brought over from Cairo (TNA/ HS6/ 776) and this limited arms drops to BLO’s and the partisans in northern Italy where only 41% of the proposed drops were completed limiting their tactical responses in the region despite the Bern legation providing good intelligence on Italian partisans operating from the Swiss borders. The result was for greater reliance on OSS and spare personnel from Force 139. Approximately, 250 agents were trained in Italy from a pool in Cairo, however, not all were designated Cichociemni.
With the impending withdrawal of Polish Forces from Italy, Lt. Col. Marian Dorotyz-Malewicz was instructed to hide $1m in a convent of the Fatebenefratelli, on Tiber Island in the centre of Rome (Borkowska, 2023) since the Polish base ‘Niebo’ (Heaven or Sky) had been moved there. On 4th August 1945 the funds were loaded onto trucks and hidden in the convent under strict guard and surveillance. In October 1945, II Corps intelligence officers commandeered the funds. On 9th October 1945 Polish intelligence officers entered the apartment of Col. Dorotyz-Malewicz on the Via Della Fonte di Fauno when he apparently shot himself before arrest and later died in the 104th British Military Hospital in Rome. The story of Dorotyz-Malewicz death remains contested and controversial (See SOE, Poles and the Balkan Connection page).
Convent of the Fatebenefratelli / Polish Base Niebo
Source: N/K
Impudent (M.E. 46):
The base was commanded by Maj. Marmion Ferrers-Guy (M.P.O 40) with administration under Capt. Andrews (MP 41). Lt. Kowerski-Kennedy (M.P. 42) acting as a Conducting Officer who had completed his SOE training in Palestine between February and August 1943 (TNA/ HS9-830-3). His duties in Italy were completed in March 1945 and returned to Britain on 20th April 1945 where he was transferred to X Agents (Germany) for anti-black market duties and worked for S.A.A.R.F. Other support officers were Lt. C. McLachlan (MP 27), Maj. F. Howarth (MP 50) and Lt. C. Robson (MP 51).
M.E. 46 was based at Campo Casale airfield and the personal files (P/F) describe their roles as ‘training’ for the Polish army. The staff had been through SOE training in weapons, paramilitary training with some completing parachute training and intelligence. Some had also been instructors in the SOE training camps (STS). There is no known description or clarification of their work. It is possible to surmise their work was based on intelligence liaison between the Allies and the Poles, or training Poles for infiltration behind the lines. The training for the Cichociemni had a different focus and unlikely to mix training programmes for security of the candidates. They operated alongside SOE who were under the command of Lt. Col. Threlfall at the Head Quarters Special Operations Mediterranean (H.Q.S.O.(M) in Monopoli where they also covered the Czechoslovakian operations. Capt. Klauber (MP 60) acted as a liaison officer for the Poles, with Kanski covering the Czech’s and Bohusz Szysko the Hungarians.
Special Training Centre (STC) Mount Carmel and RAF Ramat David
Both Mount Carmel (STC 102)and RAF Ramat David were not exclusively used by SOE with some Polish agents seconded to operations in the Balkans and Greek Islands. The history of the training centre is fascinating due to its secret links in the training of groups like the Haganah and Palmach (Bauer, 1966; Stoil, 2024). Little has been written about the training for paramiltary operations or the parachuting courses, however it is safe to assume the training mirror imaged established training courses by SOE and the Polish Cichociemni.
Mont Carmel, Haifa, Palestine
Souce: DIY.ORG
Selected References:
Bauer, Y. (1966) “From Cooperation to Resistance: The Haganah 1838-1946”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.2, No. 3, pp.182-210.
Borkowska, M. (2023) “Communist Poland confiscated Polish pre-war military Fund. How? And what happened to it?”, TVP Weekly, 06.09.2023.
Ciechanowski, J. (2005). “The Middle East”, in Sterling, T; Nałecz, D and Dubicki, T (Eds) “The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee, Vol.1”, Valentine Mitchel, UK, Ch. 40.
Cynk, J.B. (1998) “The Polish Air Force at War. The Official History 1943-1945”, Schiffer Military History, USA.
Dicelgie, A. (2023) “Methodology for the Study of the Vulnerability of Historic Buildings: The Reconstruction of the Transformation Phases of the Church of the Abbey-Castle of Santo Stefano in Monopoli in Puglia (Italy)”, Sustainability, Vol. 15, pp. 1-16.
Dixon (2020) TBC
Dzierżek, A. (1995) “Pomocnicza Służba Kobiet w Polskich Siłach Zbrojnych na Zachodzie 1939-1945” Koło Kobiet Żołnierzy PSZ, UK.
Garlinski, J. (1969) “Poland, SOE and the Allies,” George Allen and Unwin, U.K.
Grabowski, W. (2013) “Pierwszy kurs spadochronowy” in Ujazdowska, T and Bożejewicz, K. (eds) Biuletyn Informacyjnj: SPP w Londynie 7/2012”, The Polish Underground Study Trust, UK, pp. 16-17.
Gregory, D. (2022) “The Global Infrastructure of the Special Operations Executive”, Routledge, UK.
Iranek-Osmecki, G. (1954) “The Unseen and Silent”, Seed and Ward, UK.
Kochanski, H. (2012)“The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War”, Allan Lane, UK.
Lorys, J.J (1993) “Historia Polskiego Znaku Spadochronowego”, Instytut Polski I Muzeum Im Gen. Sikorskiego, London.
Ogden,A. (2011) “A Spur Called Courage: SOE Heroes in Italy”, Bene Factum Publishing, UK.
Patek, A. (2023) “Polish War Refugees Interned in Palestine in the light of ‘Mazra’a Chronicle”, Studia Środkowoeuropejskie I Bałkanistyczne DOI 10.4467/2543733XSSB.23.001.18427 pp.9-20.
Pepłoński, A. (2005) “North Africa”, in Sterling, T; Nałecz, D and Dubicki, T (Eds) ““The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee,” Vol.1”, Valentine Mitchel, UK, Ch 22.
Rogalski, W. (2022) “Special Operations Executive: Polish Section: The Death of the Second Polish Republic”, Helion & Co. UK.
Śledziński, K. (2012) “Cichociemni (Elita Polskiej Dywersji)”, Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy, Poland.
Słowikowski, (2010) “Codename Rygor: The Spy Behind the Allied Victory in North Africa“, Dialogue, UK.
Stafford, D. (2011)“Mission Accomplished: SOE and Italy 1943-1945”, The Bodley Head, UK.
Stoil, J. (2024) “The German Unit of the Palmach: a suicide commando in the Second World War Palestine Mandate”, British Journal for Military History, Vol. 10, Issue 1, pp. 133-153.
Tudor, M. (2011)“SOE in Italy 1940-1945: The Real Story”, Emilia Publishing, UK.
Turner, D. (2022) “The Secrets of Station 14”, The History Press, UK.
Valentine, I(2004) “Station 43: Audley End House and SOE’s Polish Section”, Sutton Publishing, UK.
Wales, C.T. (2005) “The Massingham Mission and the ‘Secret Relationship’: Cooperation and Rivalry between the Anglo-American Clandestine Services in French North Africa, November 1942-May 1943”, Intelligence and National Security, Vol.20, No. 1, pp.44-71.
Websites:
https://www.idf.il/en/articles/2023/the-untold-story-behind-the-palmach-s-first-mission/
https://szlakinadziei.ipn.gov.pl/sne/exposures/places/11373,Brindisi.html
https://www.forgottenairfields.com/airfield-brindisi-san-vito-dei-normanni-586.html
