The Polish nation re-emerged in 1918 after 123 years of obscurity and subjugation by Germany, Russia, and the Austro - Hungarian Empire. While the Poles quickly implemented political and economic systems to attain 'nationhood,'' external forces were quick to seize on any opportunity to test Poland's strength while there was a vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. Within three years of its re-emergence, Poland had fought forces from Germany, Lithuania, the Ukraine and Russia over sovereignty of land created through the Treaty of Versailles.

While Polish politicians like Dmowski wanted frontiers based upon ethnic boundaries which tallied with Lord Curzon's proposals for Poland's future boundaries (Rees, 2009), many Poles sought the former glory of the Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth which had existed at the end of the eighteenth century. While Dmowski's National Committee was officially recognised as representing Poland at the Paris conference (Paczkowski, 2003; Kochanski, 2012) Piłsudski had in 1918 declared an independent nation and sought to push boundaries further East reminiscent of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the antagonism of Russia (Paczkowski, 2003; Rees, 2009; Kochanski, 2012). The Soviets saw Poland as a barrier to the expansion of communism that resulted in a disastrous war in 1920 with Pitsudski's genius military stroke almost annihilating the Soviets at the gates of Warsaw - The Miracle on the Vistula. The Soviet losses were substantial with almost 10,000 killed, 30,000 missing and 66,000 prisoners. The Soviet army that attacked Poland was led by Vladimir Lenin who suffered further defeats that resulted in peace treaties between the Poles, Soviets and the Ukrainians securing Poland's eastern frontiers for the time being at the Treaty of Riga. The Soviets still 'smarting' from the defeat, started to undermine the Treaty of Riga by passing a resolution at the Cominton's 5th Congress for East Galicia to be incorporated into the Soviet Union (Rogalski, 2017). The regional Commissar, Josef Stalin tried to cover his failings in the defeat through using Lord Curzon's proposals as a cover for political manipulation within the region (Rees, 2009).

The ‘Polish Question’ had dogged politicians both during war and at the Treaty of Versailles (Kochanski, 2012) on the future shape of Poland’s borders, particularly with Germany. Several options faced the Entente where the focus on internationalising the Vistula to give Poland access to the sea at Danzig (Gdańsk) (Kochanski, 2012) resulted in the Polish Corridor as a compromise that would have far reaching consequences in the eyes of the newly elected Adolph Hitler (Moorhouse, 2019) despite the issue being settled in Article 104 of the Treaty of Versailles (Kochanski, 2012). While Britain had lobbied for the Curzon Line to be adopted to delineate the eastern border giving some recognition to of independence to Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian interests (the area known as Kresy) within the geographic region, Piłsudski’s land grab and Polonisation infuriated the local populous (Rogalski, 2017) with new landlords taking the more fertile land. These were initially ‘gifted’ to ex-military who had fought in the Russo-Polish war and later entrepreneurs taking up attractive loans to develop the agrarian economy (Rogalski, 2017). Indeed, the region of Kresy became symbolic of Poland’s past greatness that Piłsudski was reluctant to forego (Kochanski, 2012). Although Lewis Namier, a Pole of Jewish descent had been attributed to the authorship of the Curzon Line, his anti-Polish views of encroachment into Kresy mirrored British Policy towards Poland and had little influence over Lloyd Georges government (Rusin, 2013).

Upper Silesia was predominantly working-class Poles with ethnic German landowners and industrialists that was another friction point for the Entente who ordered a plebiscite to determine the future of territory east of the river Oder to reduce discrimination against the Poles. Propaganda and ‘strong arm’ tactics by both sides and the orchestrated mass migration of Germans threatened any attempt to hold the plebiscites that resulted in a series of uprisings between 1919 and finally in May 1921. The need for Entente troops who were French and sympathetic to the Polish cause, kept some semblance of peace that resulted in the German Wirth government to resign and the Poles response to the League of Nations decision and ratification in October 1921 lacked enthusiasm (Kochanski, 2012).

Piłsudski also exploited the power vacuum in central Europe during the inter-war years where he explored the significant relations between Warsaw and Bratislava over the ‘Slovak Question’ of autonomy (Lewkowicz, 2020) while at the same time annexing Cieszyn in Silesia in 1919, forcing the Entente to intervene and seek a negotiated settlement at the Spa Conference in Belgium in July 1920. However, minor border disputes with Slovakia and the Czech’s continued right up to the outbreak of war (Rees, 2009; Kochanski, 2012; Lewkowicz, 2020).

The complex negotiations based on ethnicity meant not all would remain within their native countries and resulted in the Minorities Treaty that all parties had to sign despite the Jews lobbying for a separate state within Poland (Kochanski, 2012) and other minorities stranded in states they felt little allegiance to. In Keynes’s analysis of the Treaty of Versailles, the root of the Great Depression and handling of minorities would not settle geo-political issues. Bottom (2003: 367) suggested “The catastrophic lose-lose nature of the Versailles Treaty illustrates the way in which complexity necessitates reliance on simplifying heuristics while propagating and amplifying the impact of the bias that is generated”.

The degree of friction caused by complex ethnic boundaries and contested places, ultimately led to the outbreak of war.

Prologue to War

The fledgling parliament (Sejm) passed the Army Law in February 1919 and appointed Jozef Pilsudski as commander - in - chief. The inter-war army was initially a 'motley-crew' of units largely made up of prisoners of war from German and Austro-Hungarian army or small political militias (Ascherson, 1987; Zaloga and Madej, 1991). Historically, Poland had provided the elite cavalry for Napoleon and this relationship had ironically been maintained in both the First and Second World Wars.

In France, General Jozef Haller had commanded six divisions of the Polish Army during the 1914 -18 War and other units had been attached to the French Foreign Legion. At the outbreak of war 25,000 Polish-Americans had volunteered to fight in the trenches. These volunteers were trained in Canada while the USA languished in neutrality. (The Haller Army was transferred to Poland in 1919).

The tsarist government had also allowed the formation of a Polish Legion (Pulawy Legion). However, increasing political tension within Russia and fears of growing Polish nationalism, saw it disbanded until the more liberal regime of Kerensky in 1917 enabled the formation of the 1st Polish Eastern Corps and transferred to the front in Byelorussia.

Pilsudski commanded an army trained by its adversaries and commanded by an officer corps drawn largely from the old Austro - Hungarian Empire that led to tension within the armed forces. Many of these units consisted of up to 40% non-Polish ethnic origin (Zaloga and Madej, 1991).

As Poland regained its nationhood, border skirmishes enabled the 'new army' to emerge as a more cohesive unit. The 1920 - 21 Polish - Soviet War was a brief but terrifying moment for the whole of Europe (Ascherson, 1987, Stafford, 1997). To numerous observers, the Poles were about to achieve what the White Russians had not - the overthrow of the Bolsheviks (Stafford, 1997).

Churchill had seen and hoped to have funded the campaign by Savinkov, an anti - Tsarist and anti - Bolshevik Russian for a campaign to thwart the rise in communism. The 'Greens' or Union for the Defence of the Motherland carried out a series of sabotage operations against rolling stock, ambushing Bolshevik patrols and organized the assassination of leading local Bolsheviks within Russia. Pilsudski supported Savinkov who was unaware that the Cheka had penetrated his organization. White Russians still envisaged Poland being reabsorbed into the Russian Empire and this fundamental political stance negated any support Pilsudski may have given.

In April 1920 Poland supported the Ukrainian nationalist forces and invaded the Ukraine. The operation was so successful with Polish cavalry units pushing towards Kiev that the humiliated Soviets sought retribution. With the White Russian Army quashed, the Soviets pushed the Poles back to the gates of Warsaw. By the end of the summer 1920, Pilsudski had engineered a brilliant counterattack (Zaloga and Madej, 1991) and pushed the Soviets back to the border.

Russian peasant revolts in Tambov and the Kronstadt mutiny caused by famine, forced Lenin to alter his economic 'reforms' and with an embarrassing defeat, bided his time. Poland's military ability did not deter Czechoslovakia from seizing a contested strip of territory near the city of Cieszyn. In the run up to the Second World War, Poland was bordered by neighbourly disputes that appeared unsolvable.

State of the Armed Forces

Much of the First World War's Eastern Front had been fought over Polish soil. Previous imperial powers had stripped agricultural resources and made no industrial investment apart from a few textile factories in Lodz. The Polish State was in a dire economic situation. While the fledgling democracy had flexed its political and military muscles, the economy was a shambles.

Military training and support came from France. French officers training and theory favoured a strategy of static attrition. To lessen French influence, Pilsudski requested their departure in the late 1920s (Zaloga and Madej, 1991). Political infighting along ethnic and party lines resulted in a coup d'etat in 1926 by Pilsudski. Industrialization in southern Poland had enabled the Poles to produce fighter aircraft (P.7 and P.11) superior to contemporary German and Russian designs, however, these were largely shipped abroad to countries like Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey for foreign exchange earnings to fund the economy. Funding of the armed services represented 10% of the German Luftwaffe's 1939 budget (Zaloga and Madej, 1991:11)

Polish Defence Budget 1938 - 1939
Service	Millions Zloty	%
Military administration	100	12.5
Infantry	225	28.2
Cavalry	58	7.3
National Guard	7	0.9
Artillery	16	2
Armored Force	13.7	1.7
Engineers	8.9	1.1
Communications	5.1	0.6
Quartermaster	1.8	0.2
Air Force	46.3	5.8
Navy	21.7	2.7
Industrial preparations	6	0.7
Research and Training	30	3.8
Reservist stipends	8	1
Rail and road transport	15	1.9
Construction	22	2.7
Reserve supplies	197	24.7
Salaries	16	2

Source: Zaloga and Madej, 1991:13

While Poland began updating its armed forces, its budgets were modest and suffered from defence budgets being postponed until the mid 1940s. Unfortunately, this set back modernization by at least a generation for all key strategic weaponry.