The Middle East during World War II might be regarded as the most overlooked theatre of operations. Images of the British Army in Palestine, Egypt and the defeat of Rommel at El-Alamein or Polish troops from the Independent Carpathian Rifle Brigade (Samodzielna Brygada Strzelców Karpackich) posing in Jerusalem or with the pyramids in the background, masks key operations that took place within the region within the ‘shadows’ of warfare. However, SOE’s role in the region was impacted upon by a series of institutional crisis over its role (Kelly, 2006) and the poor management of the station in Cairo which was wracked by poor security, infighting and conflicts with other agencies due to the poor recruitment and appointments of individuals.

While the Independent Rifle Brigade (SBSK) was initially formed from troops that had escaped from Romania (Kochanski, 2012) by Col. Stanisław Kopański in Homs, Syria, and later moved to El Latrun in Palestine, Link: Polish II Corps Polish Intelligence had been cultivating a network of ‘stations’ linking Poland through the Balkans via Istanbul to the Middle East. The Axis powers focussed on recruitment of collaborators and sympathisers, stirring up ‘old wounds’ with the Jewish community in Palestine, Egypt and pockets of Adenite and Yemenite Jews scattered around the region. Britain’s imperial dominance within the region and deep Arab resentment provided a ‘fertile ground’ for Axis propaganda to inflame Arab nationalist sentiment throughout the Middle East. However, the Arab nationalist movement was fragmented, lacked cohesion and strategy at this stage of the war to counter British imperialism that effectively ‘neutered’ the movement until the war’s conclusion. As the role of Britain Empire entered a ‘twilight’ period in the late 1940s, opportunities for the rise of pan-Arab nationalism emerged. Axis propaganda and subversion was more of an irritation than a real threat. The defeat of Rommel’s Africa Corps at the second battle at El-Alamein in 1942 while it was a military catastrophe, it was also a triumph for deception and intelligence by the Allies.

Or was it? It was known the anti-Jewish revolts in 1929 and later in 1936 together with the pro-German coup in Iraq in April 1941was funded by the pre-war German government and later the Nazis. The Nazis worked closely with pro-Nazi Arab exiles in Berlin to shape propaganda towards the ideals of Arab nationalists (Herf, 2009; Rubin and Schwanitz, 2014)) that despite being a shift in Nazi ideology, had limited appeal due to limited cultural themes and consensus amongst the Arab exiles (Nicosia, 2015). Their defeat was more through intelligence gathering, codebreaking and spies – everywhere (Gørenberg, 2021). Likewise, Hitler had indicated to the exiled Arab nationalists that in the early stages of the war, a breakthrough in the Caucuses would enable the German Army to enter the Middle East and Einsatzgruppen units would be dispatched to Palestine (Breitman and Goda, 2010) as part of the Final Solution.

Polish Networks:

The centre for intelligence gathering was in the Polish Embassy in Istanbul, Turkey until it moved operations to Jerusalem in the autumn of 1940 with the setting up of Station ‘T’. SIS had opened up a dialogue with Maj. Jozef Bińkowski (Binky) in December 1940 who later moved to to Tehran in order to work closely with British Intelligence in the autumn of 1941 (Bennet, 2005). A proposal by Bińkowski to embed a Polish intelligence office, Capt. Mazur within the British Consulate in Mashad met with opposition by SIS due to the sensitivity within the region (Bennet, 2005) since the Allies and the Soviets had jointly taken control of the country between August and September 1941 with the Soviets controlling the north and the British the centre and south. The loss of Iranian neutrality was a result of Reza Shah’s sympathy towards Nazi Germany whose political beliefs and political manipulation had a long lasting impact on the country.

From 1942 Polish evacuees from Soviet Russia were temporarily encamped in Iran before former soldiers were shipped to Palestine via a camp near Baghdad Link: Polish II Corps and approximately 120,000 troops made the journey to Palestine. One of the greatest threats to the Polish Armed forces in the Middle East was infiltration of communist sympathisers within the ranks of the forces from their imprisonment in the Gulags and camps in the Soviet Union. Desertion of Polish-Jews was significant through being encourages through activities of the Jewish Agency for Israel in Palestine (Kochanski, 2012; Patek, 2012; Koreś, 2024). The problem was amplified through the Yalta agreement and the anticipated conclusion of the war. Col. Stanisław Gano’s (Head of Polish Intelligence, II Bureau) investigation concluded that there was reluctance to serve in the fledgling Jewish military units under British command or join the Irgun or Haganah or, even support the hard work in joining and develop the kibbutzim system was not attractive. Many of the deserters’ sympathies lied with the Soviet backed Polish People’s Army that had fought on the Eastern Front. About 6-7,000 Polish Jews left the Soviet Union of which 3,500 – 4,000 were soldiers (Koreś, 2024) and many distinguished themselves with ‘Ander Army’ in Italy, particularly at Monte Casino. Amongst the deserters were a small group of sympathisers whom the Polish intelligence services suspected them of collaboration with foreign agencies (Patek, 2012). Those suspected of espionage were imprisoned at a special camp set up at Mazra’a (al-Mazra) (Patek, 2023) situated between Acre and Nahariyya in northern Israel. The camp was used for other nationals too and a total of seven camps were spread around Palestine (Patek, 2023). One was also set up in Scotland at Rothsay on the Isle of Bute for political prisoners and more were built at Kinledoors, Auchterarder and Inverkeithing (Webb, 2016). These were detention camps rather than concentration camps and remains a contentious issue today.

The charges ranged from collaboration with Germans, the Soviets or Italians and were involved in forging passports or supplying them, through to laundering money for families and busineses. Often, those interned in the camps in Palestine spent long periods of time awaiting clarification of the charges in poor conditions until Polish counterintelligence based in Station ‘T’ had finished their investigations (Patek, 2023). The Mazra’a Chronicles give an insight into the conditions and plight of the detainees with some daily routine records included.

The relationship between the British armed forces, the Poles and the Jewish Agency was ‘strained’ due to accusations of anti-Semitism in the armed services throughout much of the war. While there is evidence of anti-Jewish sentiments being present in some sections of the armed forces (Kochanski, 2012) the subject remains contentious and revealed as Soviet propaganda to destabilise the local relationships in the Middle East (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018) since only 601 deserters are recorded and the misinformation remains current despite contemporary research dispelling the myth. Soviet propaganda aimed at the Poles in the Middle East was vehemently rejected and the Polish ripostes were given little credit by the British Government and military authorities at the time for some unknown reason (Kochanski, 2012) that gave the falsehood lasting currency. However, the Jewish Agency cooperated with the British and Polish armed forces through providing trained paratroopers on daring missions such as Operation CHICKEN Link: Home Army & SOE / Link: SOE and the Poles in Hungary) that indicates the close and intriguing working relationships that started prior to the war with Jewish militia being trained in Poland prior to the outbreak of the war (Gil-Har, 2008).

With a growing presence of Poles in the Middle East, particularly in Palestine, a group of Polish Officers known as the ‘Crazy Gang’ independently produced pro Polish and British propaganda leaflets and radio broadcasts until both the British and Polish authorities reigned them in and took control over the content and direction (TNA/ HS4-199) due to the degree of anti-Soviet propaganda being produced by them that had infuriated Churchill (Kochanski,2012). The Poles were concerned about the presence of the Soviets in Iran as the country could be a potential jump-off point for Soviet invasion into the Middle East that could destabilise the region. The Soviet controlled area of Iran placed travel restrictions on Polish personnel (Kochanski, 2012) which added a degree to the already strained relations due to the volume of Polish refugees already in Iran or transiting to camps in the Middle East. The Polish propaganda was used to quell unease in the region since riots over food and housing shortages across the region was caused by the influx of refugees from Russia (Kochanski, 2012).

Station ‘T’ acted as a hub for other stations within the region, for example Station ‘Bałk’ in Istanbul acted as an intermediary for military attachés to Yugoslavia and Greek governments who were exiled in Cairo (Ciechanowski, 2005). It also recruited personnel for special missions into the Balkans and candidates would complete their training at STS 102/ ME 102 based at Mount Carmel, a former monestary near Haifa for operations in the Balkans and northern Italy Link: Home Army & SOE / Link: SOE and the Balkan Connection. The station also include a cryptology section and a radio-intelligence registry (Ciechanowski, 2005). By March 1944 the station had cells operation in Tel Aviv (No. 1) and Cairo (No. 2 or Tartar) which operated independently, but with consent from the British authorities. Other cells existed under diplomatic cover in Tehran (No. 5), Baghdad (No. 6) and Beirut (No. 3) all of whom reported to Jerusalem (No. 1) (Ciechanowski, 2005). ‘T’ Station employed in March 1944 36 officers, 13 NCOs, 15 civilians and 21 female volunteers from the PWSK, 6 clerks, 20 radio-telegraphic operators supported by 5 technicians, 2 laboritory assistants and 4 drivers (Ciechanowski, 2005). Despite reorganisation in the spring of 1944, the role of the staion covering counterintelligence activities and assessing the Soviet attempts to penetrate both Polish and Jewish intelligence networks continued. Their activities included seeking intelligence on post war political direction the Jewish and pan-Arab underground parties would take. By the war’s conclusion there were cells in Greece (No. 8) and cell No. 3 now included Syria with cell No. 5 covering Tehran.

Col. Ludwik Sadowski (Sadwik) had been responsible for analysing Soviet penetration into the Middle East and monitored the political situation within the region up until March 1945 while Lt. Col. Antoni Szymański, a former military attaché in Berlin, largely covered penetration of Soviet Russia on behalf of II Bureau based in Iran and was later replaced by Col. Tadeusz Rudnicki who probably acted as a liaison officer with SOE. Szymański’s wife, Halina was a Polish spy working for the British in Bern (SIS) and acted as a conduit for intelligence and information provided by Admiral Canaris on trips to Switzerland and Italy. She often met Canaris’s courier, Hans Bernd Gisevius who passed on the invasion details of France and the Low Countries. The Polish networks in the Middle East, particulalry in Palestine began to wind-down operations in July 1946.

The Women’s Auxiliary Services (PWSK or Pomocnicza Służba Kobiet) were also seconded to the Polish Signals Corps and Military Intelligence in a variety of roles, particularly W/T, censorship and cipher operations. They were assigned to posts in Tehran, Baghdad, Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo and Qassassin (Dzierżek, 1995). Towards the end of the war, their role was enhanced to focus on education and skills provision for peacetime roles Link: Women at War.

Postscript:

By late 1944, the direction of Polish intelligence towards Soviet penetration into the region raised concerns with the British authorities who officially saw the Soviets as ‘Allies’ and requested their activities reflected this point. However, Lt. Col. Gustaw Tysowski, then current head of Polish Intelligence in Jerusalem, failed to inform the British that they were running penetration operations into Soviet Russia through the deployment of agents (Bennett, 2005).-in-law of Mieczsław Golon. Their bravery and actions saved thousands of lives in southern Britain. The Monika operation was wound up on 28th August 1944.

The Middle East operations were ‘no side show’ to other major theatres of war. It was just overlooked, and more recognition needs to be focussed on the role of the Poles and its intelligence operations, particularly with the Jewish Agency and counter-intelligence activities to thwart Soviet penetration into the region. The collusion between factions of the Arab nationalists and the Nazis was an unusual relationship of exploitation rather than political consensus. Post El-Alamein and Operation TORCH, Nazi propaganda aimed at the Arab nationalists became increasingly irrelevant since in 1943 the Germans began to suffer major setbacks and defeats in North Africa and the Eastern Front which undermined any Nazi promises made to them.

Selected References